Dark, Beyond Deep: A Paradigm Shift to Cognitive AI with Humanlike
  Common Sense by Zhu, Yixin et al.
Dark, Beyond Deep: A Paradigm Shift to Cognitive AI with Humanlike Common Sense
Yixin Zhua,∗, Tao Gaoa, Lifeng Fana, Siyuan Huanga, Mark Edmondsa, Hangxin Liua, Feng Gaoa, Chi Zhanga, Siyuan Qia,
Ying Nian Wua, Joshua B. Tenenbaumb, Song-Chun Zhua
aCenter for Vision, Cognition, Learning, and Autonomy (VCLA), UCLA
bCenter for Brains, Minds, and Machines (CBMM), MIT
Abstract
Recent progress in deep learning is essentially based on a “big data for small tasks” paradigm, under which massive amounts of
data are used to train a classifier for a single narrow task. In this paper, we call for a shift that flips this paradigm upside down.
Specifically, we propose a “small data for big tasks” paradigm, wherein a single artificial intelligence (AI) system is challenged to
develop “common sense,” enabling it to solve a wide range of tasks with little training data. We illustrate the potential power of
this new paradigm by reviewing models of common sense that synthesize recent breakthroughs in both machine and human vision.
We identify functionality, physics, intent, causality, and utility (FPICU) as the five core domains of cognitive AI with humanlike
common sense. When taken as a unified concept, FPICU is concerned with the questions of “why” and “how,” beyond the dominant
“what” and “where” framework for understanding vision. They are invisible in terms of pixels but nevertheless drive the creation,
maintenance, and development of visual scenes. We therefore coin them the “dark matter” of vision. Just as our universe cannot
be understood by merely studying observable matter, we argue that vision cannot be understood without studying FPICU. We
demonstrate the power of this perspective to develop cognitive AI systems with humanlike common sense by showing how to
observe and apply FPICU with little training data to solve a wide range of challenging tasks, including tool use, planning, utility
inference, and social learning. In summary, we argue that the next generation of AI must embrace “dark” humanlike common sense
for solving novel tasks.
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1. A Call for a Paradigm Shift in Vision and AI
Computer vision is the front gate to artificial intelligence
(AI) and a major component of modern intelligent systems.
The classic definition of computer vision proposed by the pi-
oneer David Marr [1] is to look at “what” is “where.” Here,
“what” refers to object recognition (object vision), and “where”
denotes three-dimensional (3D) reconstruction and object lo-
calization (spatial vision) [2]. Such a definition corresponds to
two pathways in the human brain: (i) the ventral pathway for
categorical recognition of objects and scenes, and (ii) the dor-
sal pathway for the reconstruction of depth and shapes, scene
layout, visually guided actions, and so forth. This paradigm
guided the geometry-based approaches to computer vision of
the 1980s-1990s, and the appearance-based methods of the past
20 years.
Over the past several years, progress has been made in ob-
ject detection and localization with the rapid advancement of
deep neural networks (DNNs), fueled by hardware accelera-
tions and the availability of massive sets of labeled data. How-
ever, we are still far from solving computer vision or real ma-
chine intelligence; the inference and reasoning abilities of cur-
rent computer vision systems are narrow and highly specialized,
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require large sets of labeled training data designed for special
tasks, and lack a general understanding of common facts—that
is, facts that are obvious to the average human adult—that de-
scribe how our physical and social worlds work. To fill in the
gap between modern computer vision and human vision, we
must find a broader perspective from which to model and rea-
son about the missing dimension, which is humanlike common
sense.
This state of our understanding of vision is analogous to
what has been observed in the fields of cosmology and as-
trophysicists. In the 1980s, physicists proposed what is now
the standard cosmology model, in which the mass-energy ob-
served by the electromagnetic spectrum accounts for less than
5% of the universe; the rest of the universe is dark matter (23%)
and dark energy (72%)1. The properties and characteristics of
dark matter and dark energy cannot be observed and must be
reasoned from the visible mass-energy using a sophisticated
model. Despite their invisibility, however, dark matter and en-
ergy help to explain the formation, evolution, and motion of the
visible universe.
We intend to borrow this physics concept to raise aware-
ness, in the vision community and beyond, of the missing di-
mensions and the potential benefits of joint representation and
joint inference. We argue that humans can make rich inferences
1https://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/universe/
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
09
04
4v
1 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 20
 A
pr
 20
20
Figure 1: An example of in-depth understanding of a scene or event through joint parsing and cognitive reasoning. From a single image, a computer vision system
should be able to jointly (i) reconstruct the 3D scene; (ii) estimate camera parameters, materials, and illumination; (iii) parse the scene hierarchically with attributes,
fluents, and relationships; (iv) reason about the intentions and beliefs of agents (e.g., the human and dog in this example); (v) predict their actions in time; and (vi)
recover invisible elements such as water, latent object states, and so forth. We, as humans, can effortlessly (i) predict that water is about to come out of the kettle;
(ii) reason that the intent behind putting the ketchup bottle upside down is to utilize gravity for easy use; and (iii) see that there is a glass table, which is difficult
to detect with existing computer vision methods, under the dog; without seeing the glass table, parsing results would violate the laws of physics, as the dog would
appear to be floating in midair. These perceptions can only be achieved by reasoning about unobservable factors in the scene not represented by pixels, requiring us
to build an AI system with humanlike core knowledge and common sense, which are largely missing from current computer vision research. H: height; L: length;
W: width. 1 in = 2.54 cm.
from sparse and high-dimensional data, and achieve deep un-
derstanding from a single picture, because we have common yet
visually imperceptible knowledge that can never be understood
just by asking “what” and “where.” Specifically, human-made
objects and scenes are designed with latent functionality, de-
termined by the unobservable laws of physics and their down-
stream causal relationships; consider how our understanding of
water’s flow from of a kettle, or our knowledge that a transpar-
ent substance such as glass can serve as a solid table surface,
tells us what is happening in Fig. 1. Meanwhile, human ac-
tivities, especially social activities, are governed by causality,
physics, functionality, social intent, and individual preferences
and utility. In images and videos, many entities (e.g., functional
objects, fluids, object fluents, and intent) and relationships (e.g.,
causal effects and physical supports) are impossible to detect by
most of the existing approaches considering appearance alone;
these latent factors are not represented in pixels. Yet they are
pervasive and govern the placement and motion of the visible
entities that are relatively easy for current methods to detect.
These invisible factors are largely missing from recent com-
puter vision literature, in which most tasks have been converted
into classification problems, empowered by large-scale anno-
tated data and end-to-end training using neural networks. This
is what we call the “big data for small tasks” paradigm of com-
puter vision and AI.
In this paper, we aim to draw attention to a promising new
direction, where consideration of “dark” entities and relation-
ships is incorporated into vision and AI research. By reasoning
about the unobservable factors beyond visible pixels, we could
approximate humanlike common sense, using limited data to
achieve generalizations across a variety of tasks. Such tasks
would include a mixture of both classic “what and where” prob-
lems (i.e., classification, localization, and reconstruction), and
“why, how, and what if” problems, including but not limited to
causal reasoning, intuitive physics, learning functionality and
affordance, intent prediction, and utility learning. We coin this
new paradigm “small data for big tasks.”
Of course, it is well-known that vision is an ill-posed inverse
problem [1] where only pixels are seen directly, and anything
else is hidden/latent. The concept of “darkness” is perpendic-
ular to and richer than the meanings of “latent” or “hidden”
used in vision and probabilistic modeling; “darkness” is a mea-
sure of the relative difficulty of classifying an entity or infer-
ring about a relationship based on how much invisible common
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Figure 2: Even for as “simple” a task as making a cup of tea, a person can make use of his or her single vision system to perform a variety of subtasks in order
to achieve the ultimate goal. (a) Record of the visual fixations of three different subjects performing the same task of making a cup of tea in a small rectangular
kitchen; (b) examples of fixation patterns drawn from an eye-movement videotape; (c) a sequence of visual and motor events during a tea-making session. Rot:
rotate; ktl: kettle. Reproduced from Ref. [3] with permission of SAGE Publication, c© 1999.
sense needed beyond the visible appearance or geometry. En-
tities can fall on a continuous spectrum of “darkness”—from
objects such as a generic human face, which is relatively easy
to recognize based on its appearance, and is thus considered
“visible,” to functional objects such as chairs, which are chal-
lenging to recognize due to their large intraclass variation, and
all the way to entities or relationships that are impossible to
recognize through pixels. In contrast, the functionality of the
kettle is “dark;” through common sense, a human can easily
infer that there is liquid inside it. The position of the ketchup
bottle could also be considered “dark,” as the understanding of
typical human intent lets us understand that it has been placed
upside down to harness gravity for easy dispensing.
The remainder of this paper starts by revisiting a classic
view of computer vision in terms of “what” and “where” in
Section 2, in which we show that the human vision system is es-
sentially task-driven, with its representation and computational
mechanisms rooted in various tasks. In order to use “small
data” to solve “big tasks,” we then identify and review five cru-
cial axes of visual common sense: Functionality, Physics, per-
ceived Intent, Causality, and Utility (FPICU). Causality (Sec-
tion 3) is the basis for intelligent understanding. The appli-
cation of causality (i.e., intuitive physics; Section 4) affords
humans the ability to understand the physical world we live
in. Functionality (Section 5) is a further understanding of the
physical environment humans use when they interact with it,
performing appropriate actions to change the world in service
of activities. When considering social interactions beyond the
physical world, humans need to further infer intent (Section 6)
in order to understand other humans’ behavior. Ultimately, with
the accumulated knowledge of the physical and social world,
the decisions of a rational agent are utility-driven (Section 7).
In a series of studies, we demonstrate that these five critical
aspects of “dark entities” and “dark relationships” indeed sup-
port various visual tasks beyond just classification. We sum-
marize and discuss our perspectives in Section 8, arguing that
it is crucial for the future of AI to master these essential un-
seen ingredients, rather than only increasing the performance
and complexity of data-driven approaches.
2. Vision: From Data-driven to Task-driven
What should a vision system afford the agent it serves?
From a biological perspective, the majority of living creatures
use a single (with multiple components) vision system to per-
form thousands of tasks. This contrasts with the dominant
contemporary stream of thought in computer vision research,
where a single model is designed specifically for a single task.
In the literature, this organic paradigm of generalization, adap-
tation, and transfer among various tasks is referred to as task-
centered vision [4]. In the kitchen shown in Fig. 2 [3], even a
task as simple as making a cup of coffee consists of multiple
subtasks, including finding objects (object recognition), grasp-
ing objects (object manipulation), finding milk in the refrigera-
tor, and adding sugar (task planning). Prior research has shown
that a person can finish making a cup of coffee within 1 min by
utilizing a single vision system to facilitate the performance of
a variety of subtasks [3].
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(b)
Figure 3: Cortical responses to invisible objects in the human dorsal and ventral
pathways. (a) Stimuli (tools and faces) and experimental procedures; (b) both
the dorsal and ventral areas responded to tools and faces. When stimuli were
suppressed by high-contrast dynamic textures, the dorsal response remained re-
sponsive to tools, but not to faces, while neither tools or faces evoked much
activation in the ventral area. BOLD: blood oxygen level-dependent. Repro-
duced from Ref. [5] with permission of Nature Publishing Group, c© 2005.
Neuroscience studies suggest similar results, indicating that
the human vision system is far more capable than any existing
computer vision system, and goes beyond merely memorizing
patterns of pixels. For example, Fang and He [5] showed that
recognizing a face inside an image utilizes a different mecha-
nism from recognizing an object that can be manipulated as a
tool, as shown in Fig. 3; indeed, their results show that humans
may be even more visually responsive to the appearance of tools
than to faces, driving home how much reasoning about how an
object can help perform tasks is ingrained in visual intelligence.
Other studies [6] also support the similar conclusion that im-
ages of tools “potentiate” actions, even when overt actions are
not required. Taken together, these results indicate that our bi-
ological vision system possesses a mechanism for perceiving
object functionality (i.e., how an object can be manipulated as
a tool) that is independent of the mechanism governing face
recognition (and recognition of other objects). All these find-
ings call for a quest to discover the mechanisms of the human
Figure 4: Different grasping strategies require various functional capabilities.
Reproduced from Ref. [7] with permission of IEEE, c© 1992.
vision system and natural intelligence.
2.1. “What”: Task-centered Visual Recognition
The human brain can grasp the “gist” of a scene in an image
within 200 ms, as observed by Potter in the 1970s [8, 9], and
by Schyns and Oliva [10] and Thorpe et al. [11] in the 1990s.
This line of work often leads researchers to treat categoriza-
tion as a data-driven process [12, 13, 14, 15, 16], mostly in a
feed-forward network architecture [17, 18]. Such thinking has
driven image classification research in computer vision and ma-
chine learning in the past decade and has achieved remarkable
progress, including the recent success of DNNs [19, 20, 21].
Despite the fact that these approaches achieved good per-
formances on scene categorization in terms of recognition ac-
curacy in publicly available datasets, a recent large-scale neu-
roscience study [23] has shown that current DNNs cannot ac-
count for the image-level behavior patterns of primates (both
humans and monkeys), calling attention to the need for more
precise accounting for the neural mechanisms underlying pri-
mate object vision. Furthermore, data-driven approaches have
led the focus of scene categorization research away from an
important determinant of visual information—the categoriza-
tion task itself [24, 25]. Simultaneously, these approaches have
left unclear how classification interacts with scene semantics
and enables cognitive reasoning. Psychological studies suggest
that human vision organizes representations during the infer-
ence process even for “simple” categorical recognition tasks.
Depending on a viewer’s needs (and tasks), a kitchen can be cat-
egorized as an indoor scene, a place to cook, a place to socialize,
or specifically as one’s own kitchen (Fig. 5) [22]. As shown in
Ref. [22], scene categorization and the information-gathering
process are constrained by these categorization tasks [26, 27],
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Figure 5: The experiment presented in Ref. [22], demonstrating the diagnostically driven, bidirectional interplay between top-down and bottom-up information
for the categorization of scenes at specific hierarchical levels. (a) Given the same input image of a scene, subjects will show different gaze patterns if they are
asked to categorize the scene at (b) a basic level (e.g., restaurant) or (c) a subordinate level (e.g., cafeteria), indicating a task-driven nature of scene categorization.
Reproduced from Ref. [22] with permission of the authors, c© 2014.
suggesting a bidirectional interplay between the visual input
and the viewer’s needs/tasks [25]. Beyond scene categoriza-
tion, similar phenomena were also observed in facial recogni-
tion [28].
In an early work, Ikeuchi and Hebert [7] proposed a task-
centered representation inspired by robotic grasping literature.
Specifically, without recovering the detailed 3D models, their
analysis suggested that various grasp strategies require the ob-
ject to afford different functional capabilities; thus, the repre-
sentation of the same object can vary according to the planned
task (Fig. 4) [7]. For example, grasping a mug could result in
two different grasps—the cylindrical grasp of the mug body and
the hook grasp of the mug handle. Such findings also suggest
that vision (in this case, identifying graspable parts) is largely
driven by tasks; different tasks result in diverse visual represen-
tations.
2.2. “Where”: Constructing 3D Scenes as a Series of Tasks
In the literature, approaches to 3D machine vision have as-
sumed that the goal is to build an accurate 3D model of the
scene from the camera/observer’s perspective. These structure-
from-motion (SfM) and simultaneous localization and mapping
(SLAM) methods [29] have been the prevailing paradigms in
3D scene reconstruction. In particular, scene reconstruction
from a single two-dimensional (2D) image is a well-known ill-
posed problem; there may exist an infinite number of possible
3D configurations that match the projected 2D observed im-
ages [30]. However, the goal here is not to precisely match the
3D ground-truth configuration, but to enable agents to perform
tasks by generating the best possible configuration in terms of
functionality, physics, and object relationships. This line of
work has mostly been studied separately from recognition and
semantics until recently [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]; see
Fig. 6 [36] for an example.
The idea of reconstruction as a “cognitive map” has a long
history [39]. However, our biological vision system does not
rely on such precise computations of features and transforma-
tions; there is now abundant evidence that humans represent
the 3D layout of a scene in a way that fundamentally differs
from any current computer vision algorithms [40, 41]. In fact,
multiple experimental studies do not countenance global metric
representations [42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47]; human vision is error-
prone and distorted in terms of localization [48, 49, 50, 51, 52].
In a case study, Glennerster et al. [53] demonstrated an aston-
ishing lack of sensitivity on the part of observers to dramatic
changes in the scale of the environment around a moving ob-
server performing various tasks.
Among all the recent evidence, grid cells are perhaps the
most well-known discovery to indicate the non-necessity of pre-
cise 3D reconstruction for vision tasks [54, 55, 56]. Grid cells
encode a cognitive representation of Euclidean space, imply-
ing a different mechanism for perceiving and processing lo-
cations and directions. This discovery was later awarded the
2014 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine. Surprisingly, this
mechanism not only exists in humans [57], but is also found in
mice [58, 59], bats [60], and other animals. Gao et al. [61] and
Xie et al. [62] proposed a representational model for grid cells,
in which the 2D self-position of an agent is represented by a
high-dimensional vector, and the 2D self-motion or displace-
ment of the agent is represented by a matrix that transforms
the vector. Such a vector-based model is capable of learning
hexagon patterns of grid cells with error correction, path inte-
gral, and path planning. A recent study also showed that view-
based methods actually perform better than 3D reconstruction-
based methods in certain human navigation tasks [63].
Despite these discoveries, how we navigate complex envi-
ronments while remaining able at all times to return to an orig-
inal location (i.e., homing) remains a mystery in biology and
neuroscience. Perhaps a recent study from Vuong et al. [64]
providing evidence for the task-dependent representation of
space can shed some light. Specifically, in this experiment, par-
ticipants made large, consistent pointing errors that were poorly
explained by any single 3D representation. Their study suggests
that the mechanism for maintaining visual directions for reach-
ing unseen targets is neither based on a stable 3D model of a
scene nor a distorted one; instead, participants seemed to form
a flat and task-dependent representation.
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Figure 6: Illustration of 3D indoor scene parsing and reconstruction in an
analysis-by-synthesis fashion [36]. A 3D representation is initialized by indi-
vidual vision tasks (e.g., object detection, 2D layout estimation). A joint infer-
ence algorithm compares the differences between the rendered normal, depth,
and segmentation maps and the ones estimated directly from the input RGB
image, and adjusts the 3D structure iteratively. Reproduced from Ref. [36] with
permission of Springer, c© 2018.
2.3. Beyond “What” and “Where”: Towards Scene Under-
standing with Humanlike Common Sense
Psychological studies have shown that human visual expe-
rience is much richer than “what” and “where.” As early as in-
fancy, humans quickly and efficiently perceive causal relation-
ships (e.g., perceiving that object A launches object B) [65, 66],
agents and intentions (e.g., understanding that one entity is
chasing another) [67, 68, 69], and the consequences of phys-
ical forces (e.g., predicting that a precarious stack of rocks is
about to fall in a particular direction) [70, 71]. Such physical
and social concepts can be perceived from both media as rich
as videos [72] and much sparser visual inputs [73, 74]; see ex-
amples in Fig. 11.
To enable an artificial agent with similar capabilities, we
call for joint reasoning algorithms on a joint representation that
integrates (i) the “visible” traditional recognition and catego-
rization of objects, scenes, actions, events, and so forth; and (ii)
the “dark” higher level concepts of fluent, causality, physics,
functionality, affordance, intentions/goals, utility, and so forth.
These concepts can in turn be divided into five axes: fluent and
perceived causality, intuitive physics, functionality, intentions
and goals, and utility and preference, described below.
2.3.1. Fluent and Perceived Causality
A fluent, which is a concept coined and discussed by Isaac
Newton [75] and Maclaurin [76], respectively, and adopted by
AI and commonsense reasoning [77, 78], refers to a transient
state of an object that is time-variant, such as a cup being empty
(a)
(b)
Figure 7: Water and other clear fluids play important roles in a human’s daily
life, but are barely detectable in images. (a) Water causes only minor changes
in appearance; (b) the “dark” entities of water, fluents (here, a cup and faucet,
represented by triangles), and the intention of a human are shown in dashed
nodes. The actions (diamonds) involve agents (pentagons) and cups (objects in
circles).
or filled, a door being locked, a car blinking to signal a left
turn, and a telephone ringing; see Fig. 7 for other examples
of “dark” fluents in images. Fluents are linked to perceived
causality [79] in the psychology literature. Even infants with
limited exposure to visual experiences have the innate ability to
learn causal relationships from daily observation, which leads
to a sophisticated understanding of the semantics of events [80].
Fluents and perceived causality are different from the visual
attributes [82, 83] of objects. The latter are permanent over the
course of observation; for example, the gender of a person in a
short video clip should be an attribute, not a fluent. Some flu-
ents are visible, but many are “dark.” Human cognition has the
innate capability (observed in infants) [80] and strong inclina-
tion to perceive the causal effects between actions and changes
of fluents; for example, realizing that flipping a switch causes a
light to turn on. To recognize the change in an object caused by
an action, one must be able to perceive and evaluate the state
of the object’s changeable characteristics; thus, perceiving flu-
ents, such as whether the light switch is set to the up or down
position, is essential for recognizing actions and understanding
events as they unfold. Most vision research on action recogni-
tion has paid a great deal of attention to the position, pose, and
movement of the human body in the process of activities such
as walking, jumping, and clapping, and to human-object inter-
actions such as drinking and smoking [84, 85, 86, 87]; but most
daily actions, such as opening a door, are defined by cause and
effect (a door’s fluent changes from “closed” to “open,” regard-
less of how it is opened), rather than by the human’s position,
movement, or spatial-temporal features [88, 89]. Similarly, ac-
tions such as putting on clothes or setting up a tent cannot be
defined simply by their appearance features; their complexity
demands causal reasoning to be understood. Overall, the status
of a scene can be viewed as a collection of fluents that record
the history of actions. Nevertheless, fluents and causal reason-
ing have not yet been systematically studied in machine vision,
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 8: Inferring the potential for objects to fall from human actions and natural disturbances. (a) The imagined human trajectories; (b) the distribution of primary
motion space; (c) the secondary motion field; (d) the integrated human action field, built by integrating primary motions with secondary motions. The five objects
a-e are typical cases in the disturbance field: The objects b on the edge of a table and c along the pathway exhibit greater disturbance (in the form of accidental
collisions) than other objects such as a in the center of the table, e below the table, and d in a concave corner of the room. Reproduced from Ref. [81] with permission
of IEEE, c© 2014.
despite their ubiquitous presence in images and videos.
2.3.2. Intuitive Physics
Psychology studies suggest that approximate Newtonian
principles underlie human judgments about dynamics and sta-
bility [90, 91]. Hamrick et al. [71] and Battaglia et al. [70]
showed that the knowledge of Newtonian principles and prob-
abilistic representations is generally applied in human physi-
cal reasoning, and that an intuitive physical model is an impor-
tant aspect of human-level complex scene understanding. Other
studies have shown that humans are highly sensitive to whether
objects in a scene violate certain understood physical relation-
ships or appear to be physically unstable [92, 93, 94, 95, 96].
Invisible physical fields govern the layout and placement
of objects in a human-made scene. By human design, ob-
jects should be physically stable and safe with respect to grav-
ity and various other potential disturbances [97, 81, 98], such
as an earthquake, a gust of wind, or the actions of other hu-
mans. Therefore, any 3D scene interpretation or parsing (e.g.,
object localization and segmentation) must be physically plau-
sible [97, 81, 98, 99, 36, 100]; see Fig. 8. This observation sets
useful constraints to scene understanding and is important for
robotics applications [81]. For example, in a search-and-rescue
mission at a disaster-relief site, a robot must be able to reason
about the stability of various objects, as well as about which
objects are physically supporting which other objects, and then
use this information to move cautiously and avoid creating dan-
gerous new disturbances.
2.3.3. Functionality
Most human-made scenes are designed to serve multiple
human functions, such as sitting, eating, socializing, and sleep-
ing, and to satisfy human needs with respect to those func-
tions, such as illumination, temperature control, and ventilation.
These functions and needs are invisible in images, but shape the
scene’s layout [101, 34], its geometric dimensions, the shape of
its objects, and the selection of its materials.
Through functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
and neurophysiology experiments, researchers identified mir-
ror neurons in the pre-motor cortical area that seem to en-
code actions through poses and interactions with objects and
scenes [102]. Concepts in the human mind are not only repre-
sented by prototypes—that is, exemplars as in current computer
vision and machine learning approaches—but also by function-
ality [80].
2.3.4. Intentions and Goals
Cognitive studies [103] show that humans have a strong in-
clination to interpret events as a series of goals driven by the
intentions of agents. Such a teleological stance inspired vari-
ous models in the cognitive literature for intent estimation as an
inverse planning problem [104, 105].
We argue that intent can be treated as the transient status
of agents (humans and animals), such as being “thirsty,” “hun-
gry,” or “tired.” They are similar to, but more complex than, the
fluents of objects, and come with the following characteristics:
(i) They are hierarchically organized in a sequence of goals and
are the main factors driving actions and events in a scene. (ii)
They are completely “dark,” that is, not represented by pixels.
(iii) Unlike the instant change of fluents in response to actions,
intentions are often formed across long spatiotemporal ranges.
For example, in Fig. 9 [72], when a person is hungry and sees
a food truck in the courtyard, the person decides (intends) to
walk to the truck.
During this process, an attraction relationship is established
at a long distance. As will be illustrated later in this paper, each
functional object, such as a food truck, trashcan, or vending ma-
chine, emits a field of attraction over the scene, not much dif-
ferent from a gravity field or an electric field. Thus, a scene has
many layers of attraction or repulsion fields (e.g., foul odor, or
grass to avoid stepping on), which are completely “dark.” The
trajectory of a person with a certain intention moving through
these fields follows a least-action principle in Lagrange me-
chanics that derives all motion equations by minimizing the po-
tential and kinematic energies integrated over time.
Reasoning about intentions and goals will be crucial for the
following vision and cognition tasks: (i) early event and tra-
jectory prediction [106]; (ii) discovery of the invisible attrac-
tive/repulsive fields of objects and recognizing their functions
by analyzing human trajectories [72]; (iii) understanding of
scenes by function and activity [26], where the attraction fields
are longer range in a scene than the functionality maps [27, 107]
and affordance maps [108, 109, 110] studied in recent literature;
(iv) understanding multifaceted relationships among a group of
people and their functional roles [111, 112, 113]; and (v) under-
standing and inferring the mental states of agents [114, 115].
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Figure 9: People’s trajectories are color-coded to indicate their shared desti-
nation. The triangles denote destinations, and the dots denote start positions;
e.g., people may be heading toward the food truck to buy food (green), or to the
vending machine to quench thirst (blue). Due to low resolution, poor lighting,
and occlusions, objects at the destinations are very difficult to detect based only
on their appearance and shape. Reproduced from Ref. [72] with permission of
IEEE, c© 2018.
2.3.5. Utility and Preference
Given an image or a video in which agents are interacting
with a 3D scene, we can mostly assume that the observed agents
make near-optimal choices to minimize the cost of certain tasks;
that is, we can assume there is no deception or pretense. This is
known as the rational choice theory; that is, a rational person’s
behavior and decision-making are driven by maximizing their
utility function. In the field of mechanism design in economics
and game theory, this is related to the revelation principle, in
which we assume that each agent truthfully reports its prefer-
ences; see Ref. [116] for a short introductory survey. Building
computational models for human utility can be traced back to
the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, and to his works on
ethics known as utilitarianism [117].
By observing a rational person’s behavior and choices, it is
possible to reverse-engineer their reasoning and learning pro-
cess, and estimate their values. Utility, or values, are also used
in the field of AI in planning schemes such as the Markov de-
cision process (MDP), and are often associated with the states
of a task. However, in the literature of the MDP, “value” is
not a reflection of true human preference and, inconveniently,
is tightly dependent on the agent’s actions [118]. We argue that
such utility-driven learning could be more invariant than tradi-
tional supervised training for computer vision and AI.
2.3.6. Summary
Despite their apparent differences at first glance, the five
FPICU domains interconnect in ways that are theoretically im-
portant. These interconnections include the following charac-
teristics: (i) The five FPICU domains usually do not easily
project onto explicit visual features; (ii) most of the existing
computer vision and AI algorithms are neither competent in
these domains nor (in most cases) applicable at all; and (iii)
human vision is nevertheless highly efficient in these domains,
and human-level reasoning often builds upon prior knowledge
and capability with FPICU.
We argue that the incorporation of these five key elements
would advance a vision or AI system in at least three aspects:
1. Generalization. As a higher level representation, the FPICU
concept tends to be globally invariant across the entire hu-
man living space. Therefore, knowledge learned in one
scene can be transferred to novel situations.
2. Small sample learning. FPICU encodes essential prior
knowledge for understanding the environment, events, and
behavior of agents. As FPICU is more invariant than appear-
ance or geometric features, the learning of FPICU, which is
more consistent and noise-free across different domains and
data sources, is possible even without “big data.”
3. Bidirectional inference. Inference with FPICU requires the
combination of top-down inference based on abstract knowl-
edge and bottom-up inference based on visual pattern. This
means that systems would both continue to make data-driven
inferences from the observation of visible, pixel-represented
scene aspects, as they do today, and make inferences based
on FPICU understanding. These two processes can feed on
each other, boosting overall system performance.
In the following sections, we discuss these five key elements
in greater detail.
3. Causal Perception and Reasoning: The Basis for Under-
standing
Causality is the abstract notion of cause and effect derived
from our perceived environment, and thus can be used as a
prior foundation to construct notions of time and space [120,
121, 122]. People have innate assumptions about causes, and
causal reasoning can be activated almost automatically and ir-
resistibly [123, 124]. In our opinion, causality is the foundation
of the other four FPICU elements (functionality, physics, in-
tent, and utility). For example, an agent must be able to reason
about the causes of others’ behavior in order to understand their
intent and understand the likely effects of their own actions to
use functional objects appropriately. To a certain degree, much
of human understanding depends on the ability to comprehend
causality. Without understanding what causes an action, it is
very difficult to consider what may happen next and respond
effectively.
In this section, we start with a brief review of the causal
perception and reasoning literature in psychology, followed by
a review of a parallel stream of work in statistical learning.
We conclude the section with case studies of causal learning
in computer vision and AI.
3.1. Human Causal Perception and Reasoning
Humans reason about causal relationships through high-
level cognitive reasoning. But can we “see” causality directly
from vision, just as we see color and depth? In a series of be-
havioral experiments, Chen and Scholl [125] showed that the
human visual system can perceive causal history through com-
monsense visual reasoning, and can represent objects in terms
of their inferred underlying causal history—essentially repre-
senting shapes by wondering about “how they got to be that
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Figure 10: Examples of some of Michotte’s basic demonstrations of perceptual
causality, regarding the perception of two objects, A and B (here shown as red
and green circles, respectively). (a) The launching effect; (b) the entraining
effect, wherein A seems to carry B along with it; (c) the launching effect is
eliminated by adding a temporal gap between A’s and B’s motions; (d) the
triggering effect, wherein B’s motion is seen as autonomous, despite still being
caused by A; (e) the launching effect is also eliminated by adding a spatial gap
between A’s final position and B’s initial position; (f) the tool effect, wherein
an intermediate item (gray circle) seems merely a tool by which A causes the
entire motion sequence. These are some of the many cause-effect relationships
between objects that humans understand intuitively, and that AI must learn to
recognize. Reproduced from Ref. [119] with permission of Elsevier Science
Ltd., c© 2000.
way.” Inherently, causal events cannot be directly interpreted
merely from vision; they must be interpreted by an agent that
understands the distal world [126].
Early psychological work focused on an associative mech-
anism as the basis for human causal learning and reason-
ing [127]. During this time, the Rescorla-Wagner model was
used to explain how humans (and animals) build expectations
using the cooccurrence of perceptual stimuli [128]. However,
more recent studies have shown that human causal learning is a
rational Bayesian process [126, 129, 130] involving the acquisi-
tion of abstract causal structure [131, 132] and strength values
for cause-effect relationships [133].
The perception of causality was first systematically studied
by the psychologist Michotte [79] through observation of one
billiard ball (A) hitting another (B); see Fig. 10 [79] for a de-
tailed illustration. In the classic demonstration, Ball A stops the
moment it touches B, and B immediately starts to move, at the
same speed A had been traveling. This visual display describes
not only kinematic motions, but a causal interaction in which A
“launches” B. Perception of this “launching effect” has a few
notable properties that we enumerate below; see Ref. [119] for
a more detailed review.
1. Irresistibility: Even if one is told explicitly that A and B are
(a) (b)
Figure 11: (a) An animation illustrates the intent, mood, and role of the
agents [73]. The motion and interaction of four different pucks moving on a
2D plane are governed by latent physical properties and dynamic laws such as
mass, friction, and global and pairwise forces. (b) Intuitive theory and counter-
factual reasoning about the dynamics of the scene [74]. Schematic diagram of
a collision event between two billiard balls, A and B, where the solid lines in-
dicate the balls’ actual movement paths and the dashed line indicates how Ball
B would have moved if Ball A had not been present in the scene.
just patches of pixels that are incapable of mechanical inter-
actions, one is still compelled to perceive launching. One
cannot stop seeing salient causality, just as one cannot stop
seeing color and depth.
2. Tight control by spatial-temporal patterns of motion: By
adding even a small temporal gap between the stop of A
and the motion of B, perception of the launching effect will
break down; instead, B’s motion will be perceived as self-
propelled.
3. Richness: Even the interaction of only two balls can sup-
port a variety of causal effects. For example, if B moves
with a speed faster (vs. the same) than that of A, then the
perception would not be that A “triggers” B’s motion. Per-
ceptual causality also includes “entraining,” which is super-
ficially identical to launching, except that A continues to
move along with B after they make contact.
Recent cognitive science studies [134] provide still more
striking evidence of how deeply human vision is rooted in
causality, making the comparison between color and causality
still more profound. In human vision science, “adaptation” is
a phenomenon in which an observer adapts to stimuli after a
period of sustained viewing, such that their perceptual response
to those stimuli becomes weaker. In a particular type of adap-
tation, the stimuli must appear in the same retinotopic position,
defined by the reference frame shared by the retina and visual
cortex. This type of retinotopic adaptation has been taken as
strong evidence of early visual processing of that stimuli. For
example, it is well-known that the perception of color can in-
duce retinotopic adaptation [135]. Strikingly, recent evidence
revealed that retinotopic adaptation also takes place for the per-
ception of causality. After prolonged viewing of the launch-
ing effect, subsequently viewed displays were judged more of-
ten as non-causal only if the displays were located within the
same retinotopic coordinates. This means that physical causal-
ity is extracted during early visual processing. By using retino-
topic adaptation as a tool, Kominsky and Scholl [136] recently
explored whether launching is a fundamentally different cat-
egory from entraining, in which Ball A moves together with
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Ball B after contact. The results showed that retinotopically
specific adaptation did not transfer between launching and en-
training, indicating that there are indeed fundamentally distinct
categories of causal perception in vision.
The importance of causal perception goes beyond plac-
ing labels on different causal events. One unique function of
causality is the support of counterfactual reasoning. Observers
recruit their counterfactual reasoning capacity to interpret vi-
sual events. In other words, interpretation is not based only on
what is observed, but also on what would have happened but
did not. In one study [137], participants judged whether one
billiard ball caused another to go or prevented it from going
through a gate. The participants’ viewing patterns and judg-
ments demonstrated that the participants simulated where the
target ball would have gone if the candidate cause had been
removed from the scene. The more certain participants were
that the outcome would have been different, the stronger the
causal judgments. These results clearly demonstrated that spon-
taneous counterfactual simulation plays a critical role in scene
understanding.
3.2. Causal Transfer: Challenges for Machine Intelligence
Despite all the above evidence demonstrating the important
and unique role of causality in human vision, there remains
much debate in the literature as to whether causal relationship
understanding is necessary for high-level machine intelligence.
However, learning causal concepts is of the utmost importance
to agents that are expected to operate in observationally varying
domains with common latent dynamics. To make this concrete,
our environment on Earth adheres to relatively constant envi-
ronmental dynamics, such as constant gravity. Perhaps more
importantly, much of our world is designed by other humans
and largely adheres to common causal concepts: Switches turn
things off and on, knobs turn to open doors, and so forth. Even
though objects in different settings appear different, their causal
effect is constant because they all fit and cohere to a consistent
causal design. Thus, for agents expected to work in varying
but human-designed environments, the ability to learn general-
izable and transferable causal understanding is crucial.
Recent successes of systems such as deep reinforcement
learning (RL) showcase a broad range of applications [138,
139, 140, 141, 142], the vast majority of which do not learn ex-
plicit causal relationships. This results in a significant challenge
for transfer learning under today’s dominant machine learning
paradigm [143, 144]. One approach to solving this challenge is
to learn a causal encoding of the environment, because causal
knowledge inherently encodes a transferable representation of
the world. Assuming the dynamics of the world are constant,
causal relationships will remain true regardless of observational
changes to the environment (e.g., changing an object’s color,
shape, or position).
In a study, Edmonds et al. [132] presented a complex hierar-
chical task that requires humans to reason about abstract causal
structure. The work proposed a set of virtual “escape rooms,”
where agents must manipulate a series of levers to open a door;
see an example in Fig. 12 [132]. Critically, this task is designed
to force agents to form a causal structure by requiring agents to
(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 12: The OpenLock task presented in Ref. [132]. (a) Starting configu-
ration of a three-lever trial. All levers are being pulled toward the robot arm,
whose base is anchored to the center of the display. The arm interacts with
levers by either pushing outward or pulling inward. This is achieved by click-
ing either the outer or inner regions of the levers’ radial tracks, respectively.
Only push actions are needed to unlock the door in each lock situation. Light
gray levers are always locked, which is unknown to both human subjects and
reinforcement learning (RL)-trained agents at the beginning of training. Once
the door is unlocked, the green button can be clicked to command the arm to
push the door open. The black circle located opposite the door’s red hinge
represents the door lock indicator: present if locked, absent if unlocked. (b)
Pushing a lever. (c) Opening the door by clicking the green button
find all the ways to escape the room, rather than just one. The
work used three- and four-lever rooms and two causal struc-
tures: Common Cause (CC) and Common Effect (CE). These
causal structures encode different combinations into the rooms’
locks.
After completing a single room, agents are then placed into
a room where the perceived environment has been changed,
but the underlying abstract, latent causal structure remains the
same. In order to reuse the causal structure information ac-
quired in the previous room, the agent needs to learn the rela-
tionship between its perception of the new environment and the
same latent causal structure on the fly. Finally, at the end of
the experiment, agents are placed in a room with one additional
lever; this new room may follow the same (congruent) or differ-
ent (incongruent) underlying causal structures, to test whether
the agent can generalize its acquired knowledge to more com-
plex circumstances.
This task setting is unique and challenging for two major
reasons: (i) transferring agents between rooms tests whether
or not agents form abstract representations of the environment;
and (ii) transferring between three- and four-lever rooms ex-
amines how well agents are able to adapt causal knowledge to
similar but different causal circumstances.
In this environment, human subjects show a remarkable
ability to acquire and transfer knowledge under observationally
different but structurally equivalent causal circumstances; see
comparisons in Fig. 13 [130, 145]. Humans approached opti-
mal performance and showed positive transfer effects in rooms
with an additional lever in both congruent and incongruent con-
ditions. In contrast, recent deep RL methods failed to account
for necessary causal abstraction, and showed a negative trans-
fer effect. These results suggest that systems operating under
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(a) Transfer trial results of human participants.
(b) Transfer trial results of RL agents.
Figure 13: Comparisons between human causal learners and typical RL
agents [145]. Common Cause 4 (CC4) and Common Effect 4 (CE4) denote
two transfer conditions used by Edmonds et al. [132]. (a) Average number
of attempts human participants needed to find all unique solutions under four-
lever Common Cause (CC4; left) and Common Effect (CE4; right) conditions,
showing a positive causal transfer after learning. Light and dark gray bars indi-
cate Common Cause 3 (CC3) and Common Effect 3 (CE3) training, respec-
tively. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. (b) In contrast, RL
agents have difficulties transferring learned knowledge to solve similar tasks.
Baseline (no transfer) results show that the best-performing algorithms (PPO,
TRPO) achieve success in 10 and 25 attempts by the end of the baseline train-
ing for CC4 and CE4, respectively. A2C is the only algorithm to show positive
transfer; A2C performed better with training for the CC4 condition. DQN:
deep Q-network; DQN (PE): deep Q-network with prioritized experience re-
play; MAML: model-agnostic meta-learning.
current machine learning paradigms cannot learn a proper ab-
stract encoding of the environment; that is, they do not learn an
abstract causal encoding. Thus, we treat learning causal under-
standing from perception and interaction as one type of “dark
matter” facing current AI systems, which should be explored
further in future work.
3.3. Causality in Statistical Learning
Rubin [146] laid the foundation for causal analysis in sta-
tistical learning in his seminal paper, “Estimating causal effects
of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized studies;” see
also Ref. [147]. The formulation this work demonstrated is
commonly called the Rubin causal model. The key concept in
the Rubin causal model is potential outcomes. In the simplest
scenario, where there are two treatments for each subject (e.g.,
smoking or not smoking), the causal effect is defined as the dif-
ference between potential outcomes under the two treatments.
The difficulty with causal inference is that, for each subject, we
only observe the outcome under the one treatment that is actu-
ally assigned to the subject; the potential outcome, if the other
treatment had been assigned to that subject, is missing. If the as-
signment of the treatment to each subject depends on the poten-
tial outcomes under the two treatments, a naive analysis com-
paring the observed average outcomes of the treatments that are
actually assigned to the subjects will result in misleading con-
clusions. A common manifestation of this problem is the latent
variables that influence both the treatment assignment and the
potential outcomes (e.g., a genetic factor influencing both one’s
tendency to smoke and one’s health). A large body of research
has been developed to solve this problem. A very prominent
example is the propensity score [148], which is the conditional
probability of assigning one treatment to a subject given the
background variables of the subject. Valid causal inference is
possible by comparing subjects with similar propensity scores.
Causality was further developed in Pearl’s probabilistic
graphical model (i.e., causal Bayesian networks (CBNs)) [149].
CBNs enabled economists and epidemiologists to make infer-
ences for quantities that cannot be intervened upon in the real
world. Under this framework, an expert modeler typically pro-
vides the structure of the CBN. The parameters of the model
are either provided by the expert or learned from data, given the
structure. Inferences are made in the model using the do oper-
ator, which allows modelers to answer the question, if X is in-
tervened and set to a particular value, how is Y affected? Con-
currently, researchers embarked on a quest to recover causal
relationships from observational data [150]. These efforts tried
to determine under what circumstances the structure (presence
and direction of an edge between two variables in CBN) could
be determined from purely observational data [150, 151, 152].
This framework is a powerful tool in fields where real-
world interventions are difficult (if not impossible)—such as
economics and epidemiology—but lacks many properties nec-
essary for humanlike AI. First, despite attempts to learn causal
structure from observational data, most structure learning ap-
proaches cannot typically succeed beyond identifying a Markov
equivalence class of possible structures [152]; therefore, struc-
ture learning remains an unsolved problem. Recent work has at-
tempted to tackle this limitation by introducing active interven-
tion that enables agents to explore possible directions of undi-
rected causal edges [153, 154]. However, the space of possi-
ble structures and parameters is exponential, which has limited
the application of CBNs to cases with only a handful of vari-
ables. This difficulty is partially due to the strict formalism im-
posed by CBNs, where all possible relationships must be con-
sidered. Humanlike AI should have the ability to constrain the
space of possible relationships to what is heuristically “reason-
able” given the agent’s understanding of the world, while ac-
knowledging that such a learning process may not result in the
ground-truth causal model. That is, we suggest that for build-
ing humanlike AI, learners should relax the formalism imposed
by CBNs to accommodate significantly more variables with-
out disregarding explicit causal structure (as is currently done
by nearly all deep learning models). To make up for this ap-
proximation, learners should be in a constant state of active and
interventional learning, where their internal causal world model
is updated with new confirming or contradictory evidence.
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Figure 14: An example of perceptual causality in computer vision [155], with a causal and-or graph for door status, light status, and screen status. Action A0
represents non-action (a lack of state-changing agent action). Non-action is also used to explain the change of the monitor status to off when the screensaver
activates. Arrows point from causes to effects, and undirected lines show deterministic definition.
3.4. Causality in Computer Vision
The classical and scientific clinical setting for learning
causality is Fisher’s randomized controlled experiments [156].
Under this paradigm, experimenters control as many confound-
ing factors as possible to tightly restrict their assessment of a
causal relationship. While useful for formal science, it provides
a stark contrast to the human ability to perceive causal relation-
ships from observations alone [119, 127, 128]. These works
suggest that human causal perception is less rigorous than for-
mal science but still maintains effectiveness in learning and un-
derstanding of daily events.
Accordingly, computer vision and AI approaches should fo-
cus on how humans perceive causal relationships from observa-
tional data. Fire and Zhu [157, 155] proposed a method to learn
“dark” causal relationships from image and video inputs, as il-
lustrated in Fig. 14 [157]; in this study, systems learn how the
status of a door, light, and screen relate to human actions. Their
method achieves this iteratively by asking the same question
at different intervals: given the observed videos and the cur-
rent causal model, what causal relationship should be added
to the model to best match the observed statistics describing
the causal events? To answer this question, the method uti-
lizes the information projection framework [158], maximizing
the amount of information gain after adding a causal relation,
and then minimizing the divergence between the model and ob-
served statistics.
This method was tested on video datasets consisting of
scenes from everyday life: opening doors, refilling water, turn-
ing on lights, working at a computer, and so forth. Under the
information projection framework, the top-scoring causal rela-
tionships consistently matched what humans perceived to be a
cause of action in the scene, while low-scoring causal relations
matched what humans perceived to not be a cause of action in
the scene. These results indicate that the information projection
framework is capable of capturing the same judgments made by
human causal learners. While computer vision approaches are
ultimately observational methods and therefore are not guar-
anteed to uncover the complete and true causal structure, per-
ceptual causality provides a mechanism to achieve humanlike
learning from observational data.
Causality is crucial for humans’ understanding and reason-
ing about videos, such as tracking humans that are interact-
ing with objects whose visibility might vary over time. Xu
et al. [159] used a Causal And-Or Graph (C-AOG) model to
tackle this kind of “visibility fluent reasoning” problem. They
consider the visibility status of an object as a fluent variable,
whose change is mostly attributed to its interaction with its sur-
roundings, such as crossing behind another object, entering a
building, or getting into a vehicle. The proposed C-AOG can
represent the cause-effect relationship between an object’s ac-
tivities and its visibility fluent; based on this, the researchers de-
veloped a probabilistic graphical model to jointly reason about
the visibility fluent change and track humans. Experimental re-
sults demonstrate that with causal reasoning, they can recover
and describe complete trajectories of humans interacting fre-
quently in complicated scenarios. Xiong et al. [160] also de-
fined causality as a fluent change due to relevant action, and
used a C-AOG to describe the causal understanding demon-
strated by robots that successfully folded clothes after observ-
ing humans doing the same.
4. Intuitive Physics: Cues of the Physical World
Perceiving causality, and using this perception to interact
with an environment, requires a commonsense understanding
of how the world operates at a physical level. Physical un-
derstanding does not necessarily require us to precisely or ex-
plicitly invoke Newton’s laws of mechanics; instead, we rely
on intuition, built up through interactions with the surround-
ing environment. Humans excel at understanding their physical
environment and interacting with objects undergoing dynamic
state changes, making approximate predictions from observed
events. The knowledge underlying such activities is termed in-
tuitive physics [161]. The field of intuitive physics has been
explored for several decades in cognitive science and was re-
cently reinvigorated by new techniques linked to AI.
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(a) Will it fall? (b) In which direction? (c) Which is more likely to fall if the table was
bumped hard enough, the yellow or the red?
Figure 15: Sample tasks of dynamic scene inferences about physics, stability, and support relationships presented in Ref. [70]: Across a variety of tasks, the intuitive
physics engine accounted well for diverse physical judgments in novel scenes, even in the presence of varying object properties and unknown external forces that
could perturb the environment. This finding supports the hypothesis that human judgment of physics can be viewed as a form of probabilistic inference over the
principles of Newtonian mechanics.
Surprisingly, humans develop physical intuition at an early
age [80], well before most other types of high-level reasoning,
suggesting the importance of intuitive physics in comprehend-
ing and interacting with the physical world. The fact that phys-
ical understanding is rooted in visual processing makes visual
task completion an important goal for future machine vision
and AI systems. We begin this section with a short review of in-
tuitive physics in human cognition, followed by a review of re-
cent developments in computer vision and AI that use physics-
based simulation and physical constraints for image and scene
understanding.
4.1. Intuitive Physics in Human Cognition
Early research in intuitive physics provides several exam-
ples of situations in which humans demonstrate common mis-
conceptions about how objects in the environment behave.
For example, several studies found that humans exhibit strik-
ing deviations from Newtonian physical principles when asked
to explicitly reason about the expected continuation of a dy-
namic event based on a static image representing the situa-
tion at a single point in time [162, 161, 163]. However, hu-
mans’ intuitive understanding of physics was shown later to
be much more accurate, rich, and sophisticated than previ-
ously expected once dynamics and proper context were pro-
vided [164, 165, 166, 167, 168].
These later findings are fundamentally different from prior
work that systematically investigated the development of in-
fants’ physical knowledge [169, 170] in the 1950s. The rea-
son for such a difference in findings is that the earlier research
included not only tasks of merely reasoning about physical
knowledge, but also other tasks [171, 172]. To address such
difficulties, researchers have developed alternative experimen-
tal approaches [173, 93, 174, 175] to study the development of
infants’ physical knowledge. The most widely used approach is
the violation-of-expectation method, in which infants see two
test events: an expected event, consistent with the expectation
shown, and an unexpected event, violating the expectation. A
series of these kinds of studies have provided strong evidence
that humans—even young infants—possess expectations about
a variety of physical events [176, 177].
In a single glance, humans can perceive whether a stack
of dishes will topple, whether a branch will support a child’s
weight, whether a tool can be lifted, and whether an object can
be caught or dodged. In these complex and dynamic events, the
ability to perceive, predict, and therefore appropriately interact
with objects in the physical world relies on rapid physical infer-
ence about the environment. Hence, intuitive physics is a core
component of human commonsense knowledge and enables a
wide range of object and scene understanding.
In an early work, Achinstein [178] argued that the brain
builds mental models to support inference through mental sim-
ulations, analogous to how engineers use simulations for the
prediction and manipulation of complex physical systems (e.g.,
analyzing the stability and failure modes of a bridge design
before construction). This argument is supported by a recent
brain imaging study [179] suggesting that systematic parietal
and frontal regions are engaged when humans perform physical
inferences even when simply viewing physically rich scenes.
These findings suggest that these brain regions use a general-
ized mental engine for intuitive physical inference—that is, the
brain’s “physics engine.” These brain regions are much more
active when making physical inferences relative to when mak-
ing inferences about nonphysical but otherwise highly similar
scenes and tasks. Importantly, these regions are not exclusively
engaged in physical inference, but are also overlapped with the
brain regions involved in action planning and tool use. This in-
dicates a very intimate relationship between the cognitive and
neural mechanisms for understanding intuitive physics, and the
mechanisms for preparing appropriate actions. This, in turn, is
a critical component linking perception to action.
To construct humanlike commonsense knowledge, a com-
putational model for intuitive physics that can support the per-
formance of any task that involves physics, not just one narrow
task, must be explicitly represented in an agent’s environmental
understanding. This requirement stands against the recent “end-
to-end” paradigm in AI, in which neural networks directly map
an input image to an output action for a specific task, leaving an
implicit internal task representation “baked” into the network’s
weights.
Recent breakthroughs in cognitive science provide solid ev-
idence supporting the existence of an intuitive physics model
in human scene understanding. This evidence suggests that
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(a) Input (b) Ground-truth (c) Without physics (d) Without physics (e) With physics (f) With physics
Figure 16: Scene parsing and reconstruction by integrating physics and human-object interactions. (a) Input image; (b) ground truth; (c and d) without incorporating
physics, the objects might appear to float in the air, resulting in an incorrect parsing; (e and f) after incorporating physics, the parsed 3D scene appears physically
stable. The system has been able to perceive the “dark” physical stability in which objects must rest on one another to be stable. Reproduced from Ref. [37] with
permission of IEEE, c© 2019.
humans perform physical inferences by running probabilistic
simulations in a mental physics engine akin to the 3D physics
engines used in video games [180]; see Fig. 15 [70]. Human
intuitive physics can be modeled as an approximated physical
engine with a Bayesian probabilistic model [70], possessing the
following distinguishing properties: (i) Physical judgment is
achieved by running a coarse and rough forward physical sim-
ulation; and (ii) the simulation is stochastic, which is different
from the deterministic and precise physics engine developed in
computer graphics. For example, in the tower stability task pre-
sented in Ref. [70], there is uncertainty about the exact physical
attributes of the blocks; they fall into a probabilistic distribu-
tion. For every simulation, the model first samples the blocks’
attributes, then generates predicted states by recursively apply-
ing elementary physical rules over short-time intervals. This
process creates a distribution of simulated results. The stability
of a tower is then represented in the results as the probability
of the tower not falling. Due to its stochastic nature, this model
will judge a tower as stable only when it can tolerate small jit-
ters or other disturbances to its components. This single model
fits data from five distinct psychophysical tasks, captures sev-
eral illusions and biases, and explains core aspects of mental
models and commonsense reasoning that are instrumental to
how humans understand their everyday world.
More recent studies have demonstrated that intuitive physi-
cal cognition is not limited to the understanding of rigid bodies,
but also expands to the perception and simulation of the phys-
ical properties of liquids [181, 182] and sand [183]. In these
studies, the experiments demonstrate that humans do not rely
on simple qualitative heuristics to reason about fluid or granular
dynamics; instead, they rely on perceived physical variables to
make quantitative judgments. Such results provide converging
evidence supporting the idea of mental simulation in physical
reasoning. For a more in-depth review of intuitive physics in
psychology, see Ref. [184].
4.2. Physics-based Reasoning in Computer Vision
Classic computer vision studies focus on reasoning
about appearance and geometry—the highly visible, pixel-
represented aspects of images. Statistical modeling [185] aims
to capture the “patterns generated by the world in any modal-
ity, with all their naturally occurring complexity and ambi-
guity, with the goal of reconstructing the processes, objects
and events that produced them [186].” Marr conjectured that
the perception of a 2D image is an explicit multiphase infor-
mation process [1], involving (i) an early vision system for
perceiving [187, 188] and textons [189, 190] to form a pri-
mal sketch [191, 192]; (ii) a mid-level vision system to form
2.1D [193, 194, 195] and 2.5D [196] sketches; and (iii) a
high-level vision system in charge of full 3D scene forma-
tion [197, 198, 199]. In particular, Marr highlighted the im-
portance of different levels of organization and the internal rep-
resentation [200].
Alternatively, perceptual organization [201, 202] and
Gestalt laws [203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210] aim to re-
solve the 3D reconstruction problem from a single RGB image
without considering depth. Instead, they use priors—groupings
and structural cues [211, 212] that are likely to be invariant over
wide ranges of viewpoints [213]—resulting in feature-based ap-
proaches [214, 88].
However, both appearance [215] and geometric [29] ap-
proaches have well-known difficulties resolving ambiguities.
In addressing this challenge, modern computer vision systems
have started to account for “dark” aspects of images by incor-
porating physics; as a result, they have demonstrated dramatic
improvements over prior works. In certain cases, ambiguities
have been shown to be extremely difficult to resolve through
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(a) (b)
Figure 17: An example explicitly exploiting safety and stability in a 3D scene-understanding task. Good performance in this task means that the system can
understand the “dark” aspects of the image, which include how likely each object is to fall, and where the likely cause of falling will come from. (a) Input:
reconstructed 3D scene. Output: parsed and segmented 3D scene comprised of stable objects. The numbers are “unsafety” scores for each object with respect to the
disturbance field (represented by red arrows). (b) Scene-parsing graphs corresponding to three bottom-up processes: voxel-based representation (top), geometric
pre-process, including segmentation and volumetric completion (middle), and stability optimization (bottom). Reproduced from Ref. [98] with permission of
Springer Science+Business Media New York, c© 2015.
current state-of-the-art data-driven classification methods, indi-
cating the significance of “dark” physical cues and signals in
our ability to correctly perceive and operate within our daily
environments; see examples in Fig. 16 [37], where systems per-
ceive which objects must rest on each other in order to be stable
in a typical office space.
Through modeling and adopting physics into computer vi-
sion algorithms, the following two problems have been broadly
studied:
1. Stability and safety in scene understanding. As demon-
strated in Ref. [98], this line of work is mainly based on
a simple but crucial observation in human-made environ-
ments: by human design, objects in static scenes should be
stable in the gravity field and be safe with respect to vari-
ous physical disturbances. Such an assumption poses key
constraints for physically plausible interpretation in scene
understanding.
2. Physical relationships in 3D scenes. Humans excel in rea-
soning about the physical relationships in a 3D scene, such
as which objects support, attach, or hang from one another.
As shown in Ref. [36], those relationships represent a deeper
understanding of 3D scenes beyond observable pixels that
could benefit a wide range of applications in robotics, vir-
tual reality (VR), and augmented reality (AR).
The idea of incorporating physics to address vision prob-
lems can be traced back to Helmholtz and his argument for the
“unconscious inference” of probable causes of sensory input as
part of the formation of visual impressions [216]. The very first
such formal solution in computer vision dates back to Roberts’
solutions for the parsing and reconstruction of a 3D block world
in 1963 [217]. This work inspired later researchers to realize
the importance of both the violation of physical laws for scene
understanding [218] and stability in generic robot manipulation
tasks [219, 220].
Integrating physics into scene parsing and reconstruction
was revisited in the 2010s, bringing it into modern com-
puter vision systems and methods. From a single RGB im-
age, Gupta et al. proposed a qualitative physical representa-
tion for indoor [31, 101] and outdoor [221] scenes, where an
algorithm infers the volumetric shapes of objects and relation-
ships (such as occlusion and support) in describing 3D struc-
ture and mechanical configurations. In the next few years,
other work [222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 109, 32, 227, 228, 34]
also integrated the inference of physical relationships for var-
ious scene understanding tasks. In the past two years, Liu et
al. [35] inferred physical relationships in joint semantic seg-
mentation and 3D reconstruction of outdoor scenes. Huang et
al. [36] modeled support relationships as edges in a human-
centric scene graphical model, inferred the relationships by
minimizing supporting energies among objects and the room
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(a) Snapshots of datasets (b) Galileo model
Figure 18: Inferring the dynamics of the scenes. (a) Snapshots of the dataset;
(b) overview of the Galileo model that estimates the physical properties of ob-
jects from visual inputs by incorporating the feedback of a physics engine in
the loop. Reproduced from Ref. [230] with permission of Neural Information
Processing Systems Foundation, Inc., c© 2015
layout, and enforced physical stability and plausibility by pe-
nalizing the intersections among reconstructed 3D objects and
room layout [100, 37].
The aforementioned recent work mostly adopts simple
physics cues; that is, very limited (if any) physics-based sim-
ulation is applied. The first recent work that utilized an ac-
tual physics simulator in modern computer vision methods was
proposed by Zheng et al. in 2013 [97, 81, 98]. As shown in
Fig. 17 [98], the proposed method first groups potentially un-
stable objects with stable ones by optimizing for stability in the
scene prior. Then, it assigns an “unsafety” prediction score to
each potentially unstable object by inferring hidden potential
triggers of instability (the disturbance field). The result is a
physically plausible scene interpretation (voxel segmentation).
This line of work has been further explored by Du et al. [229]
by integrating an end-to-end trainable network and synthetic
data.
Going beyond stability and support relationships, Wu et
al. [230] integrated physics engines with deep learning to pre-
dict the future dynamic evolution of static scenes. Specifically,
a generative model named Galileo was proposed for physical
scene understanding using real-world videos and images. As
shown in Fig. 18, the core of the generative model is a 3D
physics engine, operating on an object-based representation of
physical properties including mass, position, 3D shape, and
friction. The model can infer these latent properties using rela-
tively brief runs of markov chain monte carlo (MCMC), which
drive simulations in the physics engine to fit key features of
visual observations. Wu et al. [231] further explored directly
mapping visual inputs to physical properties, inverting a part
of the generative process using deep learning. Object-centered
physical properties such as mass, density, and the coefficient
of restitution from unlabeled videos could be directly derived
across various scenarios. With a new dataset named Physics
101 containing 17 408 video clips and 101 objects of various
materials and appearances (i.e., shapes, colors, and sizes), the
proposed unsupervised representation learning model, which
Figure 19: Thirteen physical concepts involved in tool use and their composi-
tional relationships. By parsing a human demonstration, the physical concepts
of material, volume, concept area, and displacement are estimated from 3D
meshes of tool attributes (blue), trajectories of tool use (green), or both to-
gether (red). Higher level physical concepts can be further derived recursively.
Reproduced from Ref. [232] with permission of the authors, c© 2015.
explicitly encodes basic physical laws into the structure, can
learn the physical properties of objects from videos.
Integrating physics and predicting future dynamics opens
up quite a few interesting doors in computer vision. For exam-
ple, given a human motion or task demonstration presented as
a RGB-D image sequence, et al. [232] built a system that cal-
culated various physical concepts from just a single example of
tool use (Fig. 19), enabling it to reason about the essential phys-
ical concepts of the task (e.g., the force required to crack nuts).
As the fidelity and complexity of the simulation increased, Zhu
et al. [233] were able to infer the forces impacting a seated hu-
man body, using a finite element method (FEM) to generate a
mesh estimating the force on various body parts; Fig. 35d.
Physics-based reasoning can not only be applied to scene
understanding tasks, as above, but have also been applied to
pose and hand recognition and analysis tasks. For example,
Brubaker et al. [234, 235, 236] estimated the force of contacts
and the torques of internal joints of human actions using a mass-
spring system. Pham et al. [237] further attempted to infer the
forces of hand movements during human-object manipulation.
In computer graphics, soft-body simulations based on video ob-
servation have been used to jointly track human hands and cal-
culate the force of contacts [238, 239]. Altogether, the laws of
physics and how they relate to and among objects in a scene are
critical “dark” matter for an intelligent agent to perceive and un-
derstand; some of the most promising computer vision methods
outlined above have understood and incorporated this insight.
5. Functionality and Affordance: The Opportunity for
Task and Action
Perception of an environment inevitably leads to a course
of action [240, 241]; Gibson argued that clues indicating op-
portunities for action in a nearby environment are perceived in
a direct, immediate way with no sensory processing. This is
particularly true for human-made objects and environments, as
“an object is first identified as having important functional re-
lations” and “perceptual analysis is derived of the functional
concept” [242]; for example, switches are clearly for flipping,
buttons for pushing, knobs for turning, hooks for hanging, caps
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for rotating, handles for pulling, and so forth. This idea is the
core of affordance theory [243], which is based on Gestalt the-
ory and has had a significant influence on how we consider vi-
sual perception and scene understanding.
Functional understanding of objects and scenes is rooted in
identifying possible tasks that can be performed with an ob-
ject [244]. This is deeply related to the perception of causal-
ity, as covered in Section 3; to understand how an object can
be used, an agent must understand what change of state will
result if an object is interacted with in any way. While affor-
dances depend directly on the actor, functionality is a perma-
nent property of an object independent of the characteristics of
the user; see an illustration of this distinction in Fig. 21. These
two interweaving concepts are more invariant for object and
scene understanding than their geometric and appearance as-
pects. Specifically, we argue that:
1. Objects, especially human-made ones, are defined by their
functions, or by the actions they are associated with;
2. Scenes, especially human-made ones, are defined by the ac-
tions than can be performed within them.
Functionality and affordance are interdisciplinary topics
and have been reviewed from different perspectives in the lit-
erature (e.g., Ref. [245]). In this section, we emphasize the
importance of incorporating functionality and affordance in the
field of computer vision and AI by starting with a case study of
tool use in animal cognition. A review of functionality and af-
fordance in computer vision follows, from both the object level
and scene level. At the end, we review some recent literature
in robotic manipulation that focuses on identifying the func-
tionality and affordance of objects, which complements pre-
vious reviews of data-driven approaches [246] and affordance
tasks [247].
5.1. Revelation from Tool Use in Animal Cognition
The ability to use an object as a tool to alter another ob-
ject and accomplish a task has traditionally been regarded as
an indicator of intelligence and complex cognition, separating
humans from other animals [248, 249]. Researchers commonly
viewed tool use as the hallmark of human intelligence [250]
until relatively recently, when Dr. Jane Goodall observed
wild chimpanzees manufacturing and using tools with regular-
ity [251, 252, 253]. Further studies have since reported on tool
use by other species in addition to chimpanzees. For example,
Santos et al. [254] trained two species of monkeys to choose
between two canes to reach food under a variety of conditions
involving different types of physical concepts (e.g., materials,
connectivity, and gravity). Hunt [255] and Weir et al. [256] re-
ported that New Caledonian crows can bend a piece of straight
wire into a hook and use it to lift a bucket containing food from
a vertical pipe. More recent studies also found that New Cale-
donian crows behave optimistically after using tools [257]. Ef-
fort cannot explain their optimism; instead, they appear to enjoy
or be intrinsically motivated by tool use.
These discoveries suggest that some animals have the ca-
pability (and possibly the intrinsic motivation) to reason about
the functional properties of tools. They can infer and analyze
physical concepts and causal relationships of tools to approach
(a) Learning (b) Inference
Figure 20: Finding the right tools in novel situations. (a) In a learning phase,
a rational human charged with cracking a nut is observed examining a hammer
and other tools; (b) in an inference phase, the algorithm is asked to pick the best
object on the table (i.e., the wooden leg) for the same task. This generalization
entails reasoning about functionality, physics, and causal relationships among
objects, actions, and overall tasks. Reproduced from Ref. [232] with permission
of the authors, c© 2015.
a novel task using domain-general cognitive mechanisms, de-
spite huge variety in their visual appearance and geometric fea-
tures. Tool use is of particular interest and poses two major
challenges in comparative cognition [258], which further chal-
lenges the reasoning ability of computer vision and AI systems.
First, why can some species devise innovative solutions,
while others facing the same situation cannot? Look at the ex-
ample in Fig. 20 [232]: by observing only a single demonstra-
tion of a person achieving the complex task of cracking a nut,
we humans can effortlessly reason about which of the potential
candidates from a new set of random and very different objects
is best capable of helping us complete the same task. Reason-
ing across such large intraclass variance is extremely difficult
to capture and describe for modern computer vision and AI sys-
tems. Without a consistent visual pattern, properly identifying
tools for a given task is a long-tail visual recognition problem.
Moreover, the very same object can serve multiple functions
depending on task context and requirements. Such an object
is no longer defined by its conventional name (i.e., a hammer);
instead, it is defined by its functionality.
Second, how can this functional reasoning capability
emerge if one does not possess it innately? New Caledo-
nian crows are well-known for their propensity and dexterity
at making and using tools; meanwhile, although a crow’s dis-
tant cousin, the rook, is able to reason and use tools in a lab
setting, even they do not use tools in the wild [259]. These find-
ings suggest that the ability to represent tools may be more of a
domain-general cognitive capacity based on functional reason-
ing than an adaptive specialization.
5.2. Perceiving Functionality and Affordance
“The theory of affordances rescues us from the
philosophical muddle of assuming fixed classes of
objects, each defined by its common feature and
then give a name . . . You do not have to classify
and label things in order to perceive what they af-
ford . . . It is never necessary to distinguish all the
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(a) Functional basis and affordance basis in a tool-use example.
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Figure 21: (a) The task-oriented representation of a hammer and its use in
cracking a nut in a joint spatiotemporal space. In this example, an object is
decomposed into a functional basis and an affordance basis for a given task.
(b) The likelihood of a common object being used as a tool based on its func-
tionality and affordance. The warmer the color, the higher the probability. The
functionality score is the average response to the question “Can it be used to
change the status of another object?”, and the affordance score is the average
response to “Can it be manipulated by hand?”
features of an object and, in fact, it would be im-
possible to do so.”
— J. J. Gibson, 1977 [243]
The idea to incorporate functionality and affordance into
computer vision and AI can be dated back to the second In-
ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)
in 1971, where Freeman and Newell [260] argued that avail-
able structures should be described in terms of functions pro-
vided and functions performed. The concept of affordance was
later coined by Gibson [243]. Based on the classic geometry-
based “arch-learning” program [261], Winston et al. [262] dis-
cussed the use of function-based descriptions of object cate-
gories. They pointed out that it is possible to use a single func-
tional description to represent all possible cups, despite there
being an infinite number of individual physical descriptions of
cups or many other objects. In their “mechanic’s mate” sys-
Figure 22: Given the three tasks of chopping wood, shoveling dirt, and paint-
ing a wall, an algorithm proposed by Zhu et al. [232] picks and ranks objects
within groups in terms of which object in each group is the best fit for task
performance: conventional tools, household objects, and stones. Second, the
algorithm outputs the imagined use of each tool, providing an affordance basis
(the green spot indicating where the tool would be grasped by hand), a func-
tional basis (the red area indicating the part of the tool that would make contact
with the object), and the imagined sequence of poses constituting the move-
ment of the action itself. Reproduced from Ref. [232] with permission of the
authors, c© 2015.
tem [263], Connell and Brady [264] proposed semantic net
descriptions based on 2D shapes together with a generalized
structural description. “Chair” and “tool,” exemplary cate-
gories researchers used for studies in functionality and affor-
dance, were first systematically discussed alongside a compu-
tational method by Ho [265] and DiManzo et al. [266], respec-
tively. Inspired by the functional aspect of the “chair” cate-
gory in Minsky’s book [267], the first work that uses a purely
functional-based definition of an object category (i.e., no ex-
plicit geometric or structural model) was proposed by Stark
and Bowyer [268]. These early ideas of integrating function-
ality and affordance with computer vision and AI systems have
been modernized in the past decade; below, we review some
representative topics.
“Tool” is of particular interest in computer vision and
robotics, partly due to its nature as an object for changing
other objects’ status. Motivated by the studies of tool use in
animal cognition, Zhu et al. [232] cast the tool understand-
ing problem as a task-oriented object-recognition problem, the
core of which is understanding an object’s underlying func-
tions, physics, and causality. As shown in Fig. 22 [232], a tool
is a physical object (e.g., a hammer or a shovel) that is used
through action to achieve a task. From this new perspective,
any object can be viewed as a hammer or a shovel. This gener-
ative representation allows computer vision and AI algorithms
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 23: (a) Top three poses in various scenes for affordance (sitting) recog-
nition. The zoom-in shows views of the (b) best, (c) second-best, and (d) third-
best choice of sitting poses. The top two rows are canonical scenarios, the
middle row is a cluttered scenario, and the bottom two rows are novel scenar-
ios that demonstrated significant generalization and transfer capability. Repro-
duced from Ref. [233] with permission of the authors, c© 2016.
to reason about the underlying mechanisms of various tasks and
generalize object recognition across novel functions and situa-
tions. This perspective goes beyond memorizing examples for
each object category, which tends to prevail among traditional
appearance-based approaches in the literature. Combining both
physical and geometric aspects, Liu et al. [269] took the decom-
position of physical primitives for tool recognition and tower
stability further.
“Container” is ubiquitous in daily life and is considered a
half-tool [270]. The study of containers can be traced back to a
series of studies by Inhelder and Piaget in 1958 [271], in which
they showed six-year-old children could still be confused by the
complex phenomenon of pouring liquid into containers. Con-
tainer and containment relationships are of particular interest in
AI, computer vision, and psychology due to the fact that it is
one of the earliest spatial relationships to be learned, preceding
other common ones e.g., occlusions [272] and support relation-
ships [273]). As early as two and a half months old, infants can
already understand containers and containment [274, 275, 276].
In the AI community, researchers have been adopting com-
monsense reasoning [277, 278, 279] and qualitative representa-
tion [280, 281] for reasoning about container and containment
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tial entities with contextual relationships. The objects are grouped by their hid-
den activity, i.e., by latent human context or action. Reproduced from Ref. [36]
with permission of the authors, c© 2018.
relationships, mostly focusing on ontology, topology, first-order
logic, and knowledge base.
More recently, physical cues and signals have been demon-
strated to strongly facilitate reasoning about functionality and
affordance in container and containment relationships. For ex-
ample, Liang et al. [282] demonstrated that a physics-based
simulation is robust and transferable for identifying contain-
ers in response to three questions: “What is a container?”,
“Will an object contain another?”, and “How many objects
will a container hold?” Liang’s approach performed bet-
ter than approaches using features extracted from appearance
and geometry for the same problem. This line of research
aligns with the recent findings of intuitive physics in psychol-
ogy [70, 165, 181, 182, 183, 184], and enabled a few interesting
new directions and applications in computer vision, including
reasoning about liquid transfer [283, 284], container and con-
tainment relationships [285], and object tracking by utilizing
containment constraints [286].
“Chair” is an exemplar class for affordance; the latest
studies on object affordance include reasoning about both
geometry and function, thereby achieving better generaliza-
tions for unseen instances than conventional, appearance-based,
or geometry-based machine learning approaches. In partic-
ular, Grabner et al. [108] designed an “affordance detec-
tor” for chairs by fitting typical human sitting poses onto
3D objects. Going beyond visible geometric compatibility,
through physics-based simulation, Zhu et al. [233] inferred the
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Figure 25: An example of a synthesized human-centric indoor scene (a bed-
room) with an affordance heat map generated by Refs. [99, 288]. The joint
sampling of the scene was achieved by alternatively sampling humans and ob-
jects according to a joint probability distribution.
forces/pressures applied to various body parts while sitting on
different chairs; see Fig. 23 [233] for more information. Their
system is able to “feel,” in numerical terms, discomfort when
the forces/pressures on body parts exceed certain comfort inter-
vals.
“Human” context has proven to be a critical component
in modeling the constraints on possible usage of objects in a
scene. In approaching this kind of problem, all methods imag-
ine different potential human positioning relative to objects to
help parse and understand the visible elements of the scene.
The fundamental reason for this approach is that human-made
scenes are functional spaces that serve human activities, whose
objects exist primarily to assist human actions [243]. Work-
ing at the object level, Jiang et al. proposed methods that use
human context to learn object arrangement [287] and object la-
beling [110]. At the scene level, Zhao and Zhu [34] modeled
functionality in 3D scenes through the compositional and con-
textual relationships among objects within them. To further ex-
plore the hidden human context pervading 3D scenes, Huang
et al. [36] proposed a stochastic method to parse and recon-
struct scenes with a holistic scene grammar (HSG). HSG de-
scribes a functional, task-centered representation of scenes. As
shown in Fig. 24 [36], the descriptor was composed of func-
tional scene categories, task-centered activity groups, and indi-
vidual objects. In a reversal of the process of parsing scenes
using human context, scene functionality could also be used to
synthesize new scenes with humanlike object arrangements: Qi
et al. [99] and Jiang et al. [288] proposed using human-centric
representations to synthesize 3D scenes with a simulation en-
gine. As illustrated in Fig. 25 [99, 288], they integrated hu-
man activities with functional grouping/support relationships to
build natural and fitting activity spaces.
5.3. Mirroring: Causal-equivalent Functionality & Affordance
It is difficult to evaluate a computer vision or AI system’s
facility at reasoning with functionality and affordance; unlike
with causality and physics, not all systems will see functional-
ity and affordance in the same way. Indeed, humans and robots
have different morphology; therefore, the same object or en-
vironment does not necessarily introduce the same functional-
(a) Demonstration (b) Failure by pure imitation
Figure 26: (a) Given a successful human demonstration, (b) the robot may
fail to accomplish the same task by imitating the human demonstration due to
different embodiments. In this case, a two-finger gripper cannot firmly hold a
hammer while swinging; the hammer slips, and the execution fails.
ity and affordance to both robots and humans. For example,
a human with five fingers can firmly grasp a hammer that a
robot gripper with the typical two or three fingers might strug-
gle to wield, as shown in Fig. 26. In these cases, a system must
reason about the underlying mechanisms of affordance, rather
than simply mimicking the motions of a human demonstration.
This common problem is known as the “correspondence prob-
lem” [289] in learning from demonstration (LfD); more details
have been provided in two previous surveys [290, 291].
Currently, the majority of work in LfD uses a one-to-one
mapping between human demonstration and robot execution,
restricting the LfD to mimicking the human’s low-level mo-
tor controls and replicating a nearly identical procedure. Con-
sequently, the “correspondence problem” is insufficiently ad-
dressed, and the acquired skills are difficult to adapt to new
robots or new situations; thus, more robust solutions are neces-
sary. To tackle these problems, we argue that the robot must ob-
tain deeper understanding in functional and causal understand-
ing of the manipulation, which demands more explicit model-
ing of knowledge about physical objects and forces. The key to
imitating manipulation is using functionality and affordance to
create causal-equivalent manipulation; in other words, replicat-
ing task execution by reasoning about contact forces, instead of
simply repeating the precise trajectory of motion.
However, measuring human manipulation forces is difficult
due to the lack of accurate instruments; there are constraints im-
posed on devices aimed at measuring natural hand motions. For
example, a vision-based force-sensing method [237] often can-
not handle self-occlusions and occlusions caused during ma-
nipulations. Other force-sensing systems, such as strain gauge
FlexForce [292] or the liquid metal-embedded elastomer sen-
sor [293] can be used in glove-like devices; but even they can
be too rigid to conform to the contours of the hand, resulting in
limitations on natural motion during attempts at fine manipula-
tive action. Recently, Liu et al. [294] introduced Velostat, a soft
piezoresistive conductive film whose resistance changes under
pressure. They used this material in an inertial measurement
unit (IMU)-based position-sensing glove to reliably record ma-
nipulation demonstrations with fine-grained force information.
This kind of measurement is particularly important for teaching
systems to perform tasks with visually latent changes.
Consider the task of opening a medicine bottle with a child-
safety locking mechanism. These bottles require the user to
push or squeeze in specific places to unlock the cap. By design,
attempts to open these bottles using a standard procedure will
result in failure. Even if an agent visually observes a successful
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demonstration, attempted direct imitation will likely omit criti-
cal steps in the procedure, as the visual appearance of opening
both medicine and traditional bottles are typically very similar
if not identical. By using the Velostat [294] glove in demon-
stration, the fine forces used to unlock the child-safety mecha-
nism become observable. From these observations, Edmonds et
al. [295, 296] taught an action planner through both a top-down
stochastic grammar model to represent the compositional na-
ture of the task sequence, and a bottom-up discriminative model
using the observed poses and forces. These two inputs were
combined during planning to select the next optimal action. An
augmented reality (AR) interface was also developed on top of
this work to improve system interpretability and allow for easy
patching of robot knowledge [297].
One major limitation of the above work is that the robot’s
actions are predefined, and the underlying structure of the task
is not modeled. Recently, Liu et al. [298] proposed a mirror-
ing approach and a concept of functional manipulation that ex-
tends the current LfD through a physics-based simulation to ad-
dress the correspondence problem; see Fig. 27 [298] for more
details. Rather than over-imitating the motion trajectories of
the demonstration, the robot is encouraged to seek functionally
equivalent but possibly visually different actions that can pro-
duce the same effect and achieve the same goal as those in the
demonstration. This approach has three characteristics distin-
guishing it from the standard LfD. First, it is force-based: these
tactile perception-enabled demonstrations capture a deeper un-
derstanding of the physical world that a robot interacts with be-
yond visually observable space, providing an extra dimension
that helps address the correspondence problem. Second, it is
goal-oriented: a “goal” is defined as the desired state of the tar-
get object and is encoded in a grammar model. The terminal
node of the grammar model comprises the state changes caused
by forces, independent of embodiments. Finally, this method
uses mirroring without overimitation: in contrast to the classic
LfD, a robot does not necessarily mimic every action in a hu-
man demonstration; instead, the robot reasons about the motion
to achieve the goal states based on the learned grammar and
simulated forces.
6. Perceiving Intent: The Sense of Agency
In addition to inanimate physical objects, we live in a world
with a plethora of animate and goal-directed agents, whose
agency implies the ability to perceive, plan, make decisions,
and achieve goals. Crucially, such a sense of agency further
entails (i) the intentionality [299] to represent a future goal
state and equifinal variability [300] to be able to achieve the in-
tended goal state with different actions across contexts; and (ii)
therationality of actions in relation to goals [301] to devise the
most efficient possible action plan. The perception and com-
prehension of intent enable humans to better understand and
predict the behavior of other agents and engage with others in
cooperative activities with shared goals. The construct of intent,
as a basic organizing principle guiding how we interpret one
another, has been increasingly granted a central position within
accounts of human cognitive functioning, and thus should be an
essential component of future AI.
Figure 27: A robot mirrors human demonstrations with functional equivalence
by inferring the action that produces similar force, resulting in similar changes
in physical states. Q-learning is applied to similar types of forces with cate-
gories of object state changes to produce humanobject-interaction (hoi) units.
KL: KullbackLeibler divergence. Reproduced from Ref. [298] with permission
of Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, c© 2019.
In Section 6.1, we start with a brief introduction to what
constitutes the concepts of “agency,” which are deeply rooted
in humans as young as six months old. Next, in Section 6.2, we
explain the rationality principle as the mechanism with which
both infants and adults perceive animate objects as intentional
beings. We then describe how intent prediction is related to ac-
tion prediction in modern computer vision and machine learn-
ing, but is in fact much more than predicting action labels; see
Section 6.3 for a philosophical perspective. In Section 6.4, we
conclude this section by providing a brief review of the building
blocks for intent in computer vision and AI.
6.1. The Sense of Agency
In the literature, theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability
to attribute mental states, including beliefs, desires, and inten-
tions, to oneself and others [302]. Perceiving and understanding
an agent’s intent based on their belief and desire is the ultimate
goal, since people largely act to fulfill intentions arising from
their beliefs and desires [303].
Evidence from developmental psychology shows that six-
month-old infants see human activities as goal-directed behav-
ior [304]. By the age of 10 months, infants segment continu-
ous behavior streams into units that correspond to what adults
would see as separate goal-directed acts, rather than mere spa-
tial or muscle movements [305, 306]. After their first birth-
day, infants begin to understand that an actor may consider var-
ious plans to pursue a goal, and choose one to intentionally en-
act based on environmental reality [307]. Eighteen-month-old
children are able to both infer and imitate the intended goal
of an action even if the action repeatedly fails to achieve the
goal [308]. Moreover, infants can imitate actions in a rational,
efficient way based on an evaluation of the action’s situational
constraints instead of merely copying movements, indicating
that infants have a deep understanding of relationships among
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the environment, action, and underlying intent [309]. Infants
can also perceive intentional relationships at varying levels of
analysis, including concrete action goals, higher order plans,
and collaborative goals [310].
Despite the complexity of the behavioral streams we actu-
ally witness, we readily process action in intentional terms from
infancy onward [303]. It is underlying intent, rather than sur-
face behavior, that matters when we observe motions. One la-
tent intention can make several highly dissimilar movement pat-
terns conceptually cohesive. Even an identical physical move-
ment could have a variety of different meanings depending on
the intent motivating it; for example, the underlying intent driv-
ing a reach for a cup could be to either fill the cup or clean it.
Thus, inference about others’ intentions is what gives an ob-
server the “gist” of human actions. Research has found that we
do not encode the complete details of human motion in space;
instead, we perceive motions in terms of intent. It is the con-
structed understanding of actions in terms of the actors’ goals
and intentions that humans encode in memory and later re-
trieve [303]. Reading intentions has even led to species-unique
forms of cultural learning and cognition [307]. From infants
to complex social institutions, our world is constituted of the
intentions of its agents [311, 312, 307].
6.2. From Animacy to Rationality
Human vision has the uniquely social function of extracting
latent mental states about goals, beliefs, and intentions from
nothing but visual stimuli. Surprisingly, such visual stimuli do
not need to contain rich semantics or visual features. An iconic
illustration of this is the seminal Heider-Simmel display created
in the 1940s [313]; see Fig. 28 for more detail. Upon view-
ing the 2D motion of three simple geometric shapes roaming
around a space, human participants acting without any addi-
tional hints automatically and even irresistibly perceive “social
agents,” with a set of rich mental states such as goals, emotions,
personalities, and coalitions. These mental states come together
to form a story-like description of what is happening in the dis-
play, such as a hero saving a victim from a bully. Note that
in this experiment, where no specific directions regarding per-
ception of the objects were provided, participants still tended
to describe the objects as having different sexes and disposi-
tions. Another crucial observation is that human participants
always reported the animated objects as “opening” or “clos-
ing” the door, similar to in Michotte’s “entrance” display [79];
the movement of the animated object is imparted to the door
through prolonged contact rather than through sudden impact.
This interpretation of simple shapes as animated beings was a
remarkable demonstration of how human vision is able to ex-
tract rich social relationships and mental states from sparse,
symbolized inputs with extremely minimal visual features.
In the original Heider-Simmel display, it is unclear whether
the demonstrated visual perception of social relationships and
mental states was attributable more or less to the dynamic mo-
tion of the stimuli, or to the relative attributes (size, shape, etc.)
of the protagonists. Berry and Misovich [314] designed a quan-
titative evaluation of these two confounding variables by de-
grading the structural display while preserving its original dy-
Figure 28: The seminal HeiderSimmel experiment [313]. Adults can perceive
and attribute mental states from nothing but the motion of simple geometric
shapes.
Figure 29: An illustration of chasing subtlety manipulation in the “Don’t Get
Caught” experiment. When chasing subtlety is set to zero, the wolf always
heads directly toward the (moving) sheep in a “heat-seeking” manner. When
the chasing subtlety is set to 30, the wolf always moves in the general direction
of the sheep, but is not on a perfect, heat-seeking trajectory; instead, it can
move in any direction within a 60-degree window that is always centered on
the moving sheep. When the chasing subtlety is set to 90, the wolf’s movement
is even less directed; now the wolf may head in an orthogonal direction to the
(moving) sheep, though it can still never move away from it. Reproduced from
Ref. [317] with permission of Elsevier Inc., c© 2009
namics. They reported a similar number of anthropomorphic
terms as in the original design, indicating that the display’s
structural features are not the critical factors informing human
social perception; this finding further strengthened the original
finding that human perception of social relationships goes be-
yond visual features. Critically, when Berry and Misovich used
static frames in both the original and degraded displays, the
number of anthropomorphic terms dropped significantly, im-
plying that the dynamic motion and temporal contingency were
the crucial factors for the successful perception of social rela-
tionships and mental states. This phenomenon was later further
studied by Bassili [315] in a series of experiments.
Similar simulations of biologically meaningful motion se-
quences were produced by Dittrich and Lea [316] in simple
displays of moving letters. Participants were asked to iden-
tify one letter acting as a “wolf” chasing another “sheep” let-
ter, or a “lamb” letter trying to catch up with its mother. These
scholars’ findings echoed the Heider-Simmel experiment; mo-
tion dynamics played an important factor in the perception of
intentional action. Specifically, intentionality appeared stronger
when the “wolf/lamb” path was closer to its target, and was
more salient when the speed difference between the two was
significant. Furthermore, Dittrich and Lea failed to find signif-
icantly different effects when the task was described in neutral
terms (letters) in comparison with when it was described in in-
tentional terms (i.e., wolf/sheep).
Taken together, these experiments demonstrate that even the
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Figure 30: The plan inference task presented in Ref. [318], seen from the perspective of an observing robot. (a) Four different goals (target objects) in a 3D scene.
(b) One outcome of the proposed method: the marginal probability (Prob.) of each terminal action over time. Note that terminal actions are marginal probabilities
over the probability density described by the hierarchical graphical model. (c) Four rational hierarchical plans for different goals: Goal 1 is within reach, which
does not require standing up; Goal 2 requires standing up and reaching out; Goals 3 and 4 require standing up, moving, and reaching for different objects. (d) A
progression of time corresponding to the results shown in (b). The action sequence and its corresponding probability distributions for each of these four goals are
visualized in the bar plots in the upper left of each frame. Reproduced from Ref. [318] with permission of IEEE, c© 2016.
simplest moving shapes are irresistibly perceived in an inten-
tional and goal-directed “social” way—through a holistic un-
derstanding of the events as an unfolding story whose charac-
ters have goals, beliefs, and intentions. A question naturally
arises: what is the underlying mechanism with which the hu-
man visual system perceives and interprets such a richly social
world? One possible mechanism governing this process that
has been proposed by several philosophers and psychologists
is the intuitive agency theory, which embodies the so-called
“rationality principle.” This theory states that humans view
themselves and others as causal agents: (i) they devote their
limited time and resources only to those actions that change
the world in accordance with their intentions and desires; and
(ii) they achieve their intentions rationally by maximizing their
utility while minimizing their costs, given their beliefs about the
world [319, 301, 320].
Guided by this principle, Gao et al. [317] explored the psy-
chophysics of chasing, one of the most salient and evolution-
arily important types of intentional behavior. In an interactive
“Don’t Get Caught” game, a human participant pretended to
be a sheep. The task was to detect a hidden “wolf” and keep
away from it for 20 s. The effectiveness of the wolf’s chasing
was measured by the percentage of the human’s escape attempts
that failed. Across trials, the wolf’s pursuit strategy was manip-
ulated by a variable called chasing subtlety, which controlled
the maximum deviation from the perfect heat-seeking trajec-
tory; see Fig. 29 [317] for more details. The results showed that
humans can effectively detect and avoid wolves with small sub-
tlety values, whereas wolves with modest subtlety values turned
out to be the most “dangerous.” A dangerous wolf can still ap-
proach a sheep relatively quickly; meanwhile, deviation from
the most efficient heat-seeking trajectory severely disrupts a hu-
man’s perception of being chased, leaving the crafty wolf un-
detected. In other words, they can effectively stalk the human-
controlled “sheep” without being noticed. This result is consis-
tent with the “rationality principle,” where human perception
assumes that an agent’s intentional action will be one that max-
imizes its efficiency in reaching its goal.
Not only are adults sensitive to the cost of actions, as
demonstrated above, but 6-to-12-month-old infants have also
shown similar behavior measured in terms of habituation; they
tend to look longer when an agent takes a long, circuitous route
to a goal than when a shorter route is available [321, 322].
Crucially, infants interpret actions as directed toward goal ob-
jects, looking longer when an agent reaches for a new ob-
ject, even if the reach follows a familiar path [304]. Recently,
Liu et al. [320] performed five looking-time experiments in
which three-month-old infants viewed object-directed reaches
that varied in efficiency (following the shortest physically pos-
sible path vs. a longer path), goals (lifting an object vs. causing
a change in its state), and causal structures (action on contact
vs. action at a distance and after a delay). Their experiments
verified that infants interpret actions they cannot yet perform
as causally efficacious: when people reach for and cause state
changes in objects, young infants interpret these actions as goal-
directed, and look longer when they are inefficient than when
they are efficient. Such an early-emerging sensitivity to the
causal powers of agents engaged in costly and goal-directed ac-
tions may provide one important foundation for the rich causal
and social learning that characterizes our species.
The rationality principle has been formally modeled as in-
verse planning governed by Bayesian inference [104, 323, 114].
Planning is a process by which intent causes action. Inverse
planning, by inverting the rational planning model via Bayesian
inference that integrates the likelihood of observed actions with
prior mental states, can infer the latent mental intent. Based on
inverse planning, Baker et al. [104] proposed a framework for
goal inference, in which the bottom-up information of behavior
observations and the top-down prior knowledge of goal space
are integrated to allow inference of underlying intent. In ad-
dition, Bayesian networks, with their flexibility in representing
probabilistic dependencies and causal relationships, as well as
23
the efficiency of inference methods, have proven to be one of
the most powerful and successful approaches for intent recog-
nition [324, 325, 326, 323].
Moving from the symbolic input to real video input,
Holtzen et al. [318] presented an inverse planning method to in-
fer human hierarchical intentions from partially observed RGB-
D videos. Their algorithm is able to infer human intentions by
reverse-engineering decision-making and action planning pro-
cesses in human minds under a Bayesian probabilistic program-
ming framework; see Fig. 30 [318] for more details. The inten-
tions are represented as a novel hierarchical, compositional, and
probabilistic graph structure that describes the relationships be-
tween actions and plans.
By bridging from the abstract Heider-Simmel display to
aerial videos, Shu et al. [112] proposed a method to infer hu-
mans’ intentions with respect to interaction by observing mo-
tion trajectories (Fig. 31). A non-parametric exponential poten-
tial function is taught to derive “social force and fields” through
the calculus of variations (as in Landau physics); such force and
fields explain human motion and interaction in the collected
drone videos. The model’s results fit well with human judg-
ments of propensity or inclination to interact, and demonstrate
the ability to synthesize decontextualized animations that have
a controlled level of interactiveness.
In outdoor scenarios, Xie et al. [72] jointly inferred object
functionality and human intent by reasoning about human ac-
tivities. Based on the rationality principle, the people in the
observed videos are expected to intentionally take the shortest
possible paths toward functional objects, subject to obstacles,
that allow the people to satisfy certain of their needs (e.g., a
vending machine can quench thirst); see Fig. 9. Here, the func-
tional objects are “dark matter” since they are typically diffi-
cult to detect in low-resolution surveillance videos and have the
functionality to “attract” people. Xie et al. formulated agent-
based Lagrangian mechanics wherein human trajectories are
probabilistically modeled as motions in many layers of “dark
energy” fields, and wherein each agent can choose to allow
a particular force field to affect its motions, thus defining the
minimum-energy Dijkstra path toward the corresponding “dark
matter” source. Such a model is effective in predicting human
intentional behaviors and trajectories, localizing functional ob-
jects, and discovering distinct functional classes of objects by
clustering human motion behavior in the vicinity of functional
objects and agents’ intentions.
6.3. Beyond Action Prediction
In modern computer vision and AI systems [327], intent is
related to action prediction much more profoundly than through
simply predicting action labels. Humans have a strong and
early-emerging inclination to interpret actions in terms of in-
tention as part of a long-term process of social learning about
novel means and novel goals. From a philosophical perspec-
tive, Csibra et al. [103] contrasted three distinct mechanisms:
(i) action-effect association, (ii) simulation procedures, and (iii)
teleological reasoning. They concluded that action-effect asso-
ciation and simulation could only serve action monitoring and
prediction; social learning, in contrast, requires the inferential
productivity of teleological reasoning.
Figure 31: Inference of human interaction from motion trajectories. The top
row demonstrates change within a conditional interactive field (CIF) in sub-
interactions as the interaction proceeds, where the CIF models the expected
relative motion pattern conditioned on the reference agent’s motion. The bot-
tom illustrates the change in interactive behaviors in terms of motion trajecto-
ries (Traj.). The colored bars in the middle depict the types of sub-interactions
(S). Reproduced from Ref. [112] with permission of Cognitive Science Society,
Inc., c© 2017.
Figure 32: Constructed psychological space including human-human (HH) ani-
mations with 100% animacy degree, humanobject (HO) animations, and object-
object (OO) animations. Here, a stimulus is depicted by a data point with co-
ordinates derived by the model, and the colors of the data points indicate the
average human responses to this stimulus. The two variables in the space are
the average of the measures of the degree of violation of physical laws and the
values indicating the presence of intent between two entities. The shapes of data
points correspond to the interaction types used in the simulation for generating
the corresponding stimuli (circle: HH, triangle: HO, square: OO). Reproduced
from Ref. [113] with permission of Cognitive Science Society, Inc., c© 2019.
Simulation theory claims that the mechanism underlying
the attribution of intentions to actions might rely on simulating
the observed action and mapping it onto our own experiences
and intent representations [328]; and that such simulation pro-
cesses are at the heart of the development of intentional action
interpretation [308]. In order to understand others’ intentions,
humans subconsciously empathize with the person they are
observing and estimate what their own actions and intentions
might be in that situation. Here, action-effect association [329]
plays an important role in quick online intent prediction, and
the ability to encode and remember these two component asso-
ciations contributes to infants’ imitation skills and intentional
action understanding [330]. Accumulating neurophysiological
evidence supports such simulations in the human brain; one ex-
ample is the mirror neuron [331], which has been linked to in-
tent understanding in many studies [332, 102]. However, some
studies also find that infants are capable of processing goal-
directed actions before they have the ability to perform the ac-
tions themselves (e.g., Ref. [333]), which poses challenges to
the simulation theory of intent attribution.
To address social learning, a teleological action interpre-
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Figure 33: A task is modeled as sequential intentions in terms of hand-eye coordination with a human-attention-object (HAO) graph. Here, an intention is represented
through inverse planning, in which human pose, human attention, and a visible object provide context with which to infer an agent’s intention. Reproduced from
Ref. [334] with permission of the authors, c© 2018.
tational system [335] takes a “functional stance” for the com-
putational representation of goal-directed action [103], where
such teleological representations are generated by the afore-
mentioned inferential “rationality principle” [336]. In fact, the
very notion of “action” implies motor behavior performed by
an agent that is conceived in relation to the end state that agent
wants to achieve. Attributing a goal to an observed action en-
ables humans to predict the course of future actions, evaluate
causal efficacy or certain actions, and justify an action itself.
Furthermore, action predictions can be made by breaking down
a path toward a goal into a hierarchy of sub-goals, the most ba-
sic of which are comprised of elementary motor acts such as
grasping.
These three mechanisms do not compete; instead, they com-
plement each other. The fast effect prediction provided by
action-effect associations can serve as a starting hypothesis for
teleological reasoning or simulation procedure; the solutions
provided by teleological reasoning in social learning can also
be stored as action-effect associations for subsequent rapid re-
call.
6.4. Building Blocks for Intent in Computer Vision
Understanding and predicting human intentions from im-
ages and videos is a research topic that is driven by many real-
world applications, including visual surveillance, human-robot
interaction, and autonomous driving. In order to better predict
intent based on pixel inputs, it is necessary and indispensable
to fully exploit comprehensive cues such as motion trajectory,
gaze dynamics, body posture and movements, human-object re-
lationships, and communicative gestures (e.g., pointing).
Motion trajectory alone could be a strong signal for intent
prediction, as discussed in Section 6.2. With intuitive physics
and perceived intent, humans also demonstrate the ability to
distinguish social events from physical events with very limited
motion trajectory stimuli, such as the movements of a few sim-
ple geometric shapes. Shu et al. [113] studied possible underly-
ing computational mechanisms and proposed a unified psycho-
logical space that reveals the partition between the perception
of physical events involving inanimate objects and the percep-
tion of social events involving human interactions with other
agents. This unified space consists of two important dimen-
sions: (i) an intuitive sense of whether physical laws are obeyed
or violated, and (ii) an impression of whether an agent pos-
sesses intent as inferred from the movements of simple shapes;
see Fig. 32 [113]. Their experiments demonstrate that the con-
structed psychological space successfully partitions human per-
ception of physical versus social events.
Eye gaze, being closely related to underlying attention, in-
tent, emotion, personality, and anything a human is thinking
and doing, also plays an important role in allowing humans to
“read” other peoples’ minds [337]. Evidence from psychology
suggests that eyes are a cognitively special stimulus with dis-
tinctive, “hardwired” pathways in the brain dedicated to their
interpretation, revealing humans’ unique ability to infer others’
intent from eye gazes [338]. Social eye gaze functions also
transcend cultural differences, forming a kind of universal lan-
guage [339]. Computer vision and AI systems heavily rely on
gazes as cues for intent prediction based on images and videos.
For example, the system developed by Wei et al. [334] jointly
inferred human attention, intent, and tasks from videos. Given
an RGB-D video in which a human performs a task, the sys-
tem answered three questions simultaneously: (i) “Wwere is
the human looking?”—attention/gaze prediction; (ii) “why is
the human looking?”—intent prediction; and (iii) “what task is
the human performing?”—task recognition. Wei et al. [334]
proposed a hierarchical human-attention-object (HAO) model
that represents tasks, intentions, and attention under a unified
framework. Under this model, a task is represented as sequen-
tial intentions described by hand-eye coordination under a plan-
ner represented by a grammar; see Fig. 33 for details [334].
Communicative gazes and gestures (e.g., pointing) stand out
for intent expression and perception in collaborative interac-
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Figure 34: Human gaze communication dynamics on two hierarchical levels: (i) Atomic-level gaze communication describes the fine-grained structures in human
gaze interactions; and (ii) event-level gaze communication refers to long-term social communication events temporally composed of atomic-level gaze communica-
tions. Reproduced from Ref. [340] with permission of the authors, c© 2019.
tions. Humans need to recognize their partners’ communica-
tive intentions in order to collaborate with others and success-
fully survive in the world. Human communication in mutualis-
tic collaboration often involves agents informing recipients of
things they believe will be useful or relevant to them. Melis
and Tomasello et al. [341] investigated whether pairs of chim-
panzees were capable of communicating to ensure coordination
during collaborative problem-solving. In their experiments, the
chimpanzee pairs needed two tools to extract fruit from an ap-
paratus. The communicator in each pair could see the location
of the tools (hidden in one of two boxes), but only the recipient
could open the boxes. The communicator increasingly commu-
nicated the tools’ location by approaching the baited box and
giving the key needed to open it to the recipients. The recipi-
ent used these signals and obtained the tools, transferring one
of the tools to the communicator so that the pair could collabo-
rate in obtaining the fruit. As demonstrated by this study, even
chimpanzees have obtained the necessary socio-cognitive skills
to naturally develop a simple communicative strategy to ensure
coordination in a collaborative task. To model such a capabil-
ity that is demonstrated in both chimpanzees and humans, Fan
et al. [342] studied the problem of human communicative gaze
dynamics. They examined the inferring of shared eye gazes
in third-person social scene videos, which is a phenomenon in
which two or more individuals simultaneously look at a com-
mon target in social scenes. A follow-up work [340] studied
various types of gaze communications in social activities from
both the atomic level and event level (Fig. 34). A spatiotempo-
ral graph network was proposed to explicitly represent the di-
verse interactions in the social scenes and to infer atomic-level
gaze communications.
Humans communicate intentions multimodally; thus, facial
expression, head pose, body posture and orientation, arm mo-
tion, gesture, proxemics, and relationships with other agents
and objects can all contribute to human intent analysis and com-
prehension. Researchers in robotics try to equip robots with
the ability to act “naturally,” or to be subject to “social affor-
dance,” which represents action possibilities that follow basic
social norms. Trick et al. [343] proposed an approach for mul-
timodal intent recognition that focuses on uncertainty reduction
through classifier fusion, considering four modalities: speech,
gestures, gaze directions, and scene objects. Shu et al. [344]
presented a generative model for robot learning of social affor-
dance from human activity videos. By discovering critical steps
(i.e., latent sub-goals) in interaction, and by learning struc-
tural representations of human-human (HH) and human-object-
human (HOH) interactions that describe how agents’ body parts
move and what spatial relationships they should maintain in or-
der to complete each sub-goal, a robot can infer what its own
movement should be in reaction to the motion of the human
body. Such social affordance could also be represented by a
hierarchical grammar model [345], enabling real-time motion
inference for human-robot interaction; the learned model was
demonstrated to successfully infer human intent and generate
humanlike, socially appropriate response behaviors in robots.
7. Learning Utility: The Preference of Choices
Rooted in the field of philosophy, economics, and game the-
ory, the concept of utility serves as one of the most basic prin-
ciples of modern decision theory: an agent makes rational de-
cisions/choices based on their beliefs and desires to maximize
its expected utility. This is known as the principle of maximum
expected utility. We argue that the majority of the observational
signals we encounter in daily life are driven by this simple yet
powerful principle—an invisible “dark” force that governs the
mechanism that explicitly or implicitly underlies human behav-
iors. Thus, studying utility could provide a computer vision or
AI system with a deeper understanding of its visual observa-
tions, thereby achieving better generalization.
According to the classic definition of utility, the utility that
a decision-maker gains from making a choice is measured with
a utility function. A utility function is a mathematical for-
mulation that ranks the preferences of an individual such that
U(a) >U(b), where choice a is preferred over choice b. It is
important to note that the existence of a utility function that
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Figure 35: Examples of sitting in (a) an office and (b) a meeting room. In
addition to geometry and appearance, people consider other important factors
when deciding where to sit, including comfort level, reaching cost, and so-
cial goals. The histograms indicate human preferences for different candidate
chairs. Based on these observations, it is possible to infer human utility during
sitting from videos[233]. (c) The stick-man model captured using a Kinect sen-
sor. It is first converted into a tetrahedralized human model and then segmented
into 14 body parts. (d) Using FEM simulation, the forces are estimated at each
vertex of the FEM mesh. Reproduced from Ref. [233] with permission of the
authors, c© 2016.
describes an agent’s preference behavior does not necessarily
mean that the agent is explicitly maximizing that utility func-
tion in its own deliberations. By observing a rational agent’s
preferences, however, an observer can construct a utility func-
tion that represents what the agent is actually trying to achieve,
even if the agent does not know it [346]. It is also worth not-
ing that utility theory is a positive theory that seeks to explain
the individuals’ observed behavior and choices, which is differ-
ent from a normative theory that indicates how people should
behave; such a distinction is crucial for the discipline of eco-
nomics, and for the devising of algorithms and systems to inter-
pret observational signals.
Although Jeremy Bentham [117] is often regarded as the
first scholar to systematically study utilitarianism—the philo-
sophical concept that was later borrowed by economics and
game theory, the core insight motivating the theory was es-
tablished much earlier by Francis Hutcheson [347] on action
choice. In the field of philosophy, utilitarianism is considered
a normative ethical theory that places the locus of right and
wrong solely on the outcomes (consequences) of choosing one
action/policy over others. As such, it moves beyond the scope
of one’s own interests and takes into account the interests of
others [347, 348]. The term has been adopted by the field of
economics, where a utility function represents a consumer’s or-
der of preferences given a set of choices. As such, the term
“utility” is now devoid of its original meaning.
Formally, the core idea behind utility theory is straightfor-
ward: every possible action or state within a given model can
be described with a single, uniform value. This value, usu-
ally referred to as utility, describes the usefulness of that ac-
tion within the given context. Note that the concept of utility
is not the same as the concept of value: utility measures how
much we desire something in a more subjective and context-
dependent perspective, whereas value is a measurable quantity
(e.g., price), which tends to be more objective. To demonstrate
the usefulness of adopting the concept of utility into a computer
vision and AI system, we briefly review four recent case stud-
ies in computer vision, robotics, linguistics, and social learning
that use a utility-driven learning approach.
As shown in Fig. 35 [233], by observing the choices peo-
ple make in videos (particularly in selecting a chair on which
to sit), a computer vision system [233] is able to learn the com-
fort intervals of the forces exerted on different body parts while
sitting, thereby accounting for people’s preferences in terms of
human internal utility.
Similarly, Shukla et al. [350] adopted the idea of learning
human utility in order to teach a robotics task using human
demonstrations. A proof-of-concept work shows a pipeline in
which the agent learns the external utility of humans and plans
a cloth-folding task using this learned utility function. Specifi-
cally, under the assumption that the utility of the goal states is
higher than that of the initial states, this system learns the exter-
nal utility of humans by ranking pairs of states extracted from
images.
In addition, the rationality principle has been studied in the
field of linguistics and philosophy, notably in influential work
on the theory of implicature by Grice [351]. The core insight of
Grice’s work is that language use is a form of rational action;
thus, technical tools for reasoning about rational action should
elucidate linguistic phenomena [352]. Such a goal-directed
view of language production has led to a few interesting lan-
guage games [353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358], the development
of engineering systems for natural language generation [359],
and a vocabulary for formal descriptions of pragmatic phenom-
ena in the field of game theory [360, 361]. More recently,
by assuming the communications between agents to be helpful
yet parsimonious, the “Rational Speech Act” [362, 352] model
has demonstrated promising results in solving some challeng-
ing referential games.
By materializing the internal abstract social concepts using
external explicit forms, utility theory also plays a crucial role
in social learning, and quantizes an actor’s belief distribution.
Utility, which is analogous to the “dark” currency circulating
in society, aligns social values better among and within groups.
By modeling how people value the decision-making process as
permissible or not using utilities, Kleiman-Weiner et al. [363]
were able to solve challenging situations with social dilemma.
Based on how the expected utility influences the distribution,
social goals (e.g., cooperation and competition) [364, 365] and
faireness [366] can also be well explained. On a broader scale,
utility can enable individuals to be self-identified in society dur-
ing the social learning process; for example, when forming ba-
sic social concepts and behavior norms during the early stages
of the development, children compare their own meta-values
with the observed values of others [367].
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(a) Various task executions in VRGym (b) Real-time fluid and cloth simulations in VRGym
Figure 36: VRGym, an example of a virtual environment as a large task platform. (a) Inside this platform, either a human agent or a virtual agent can perform
various actions in a virtual scene and evaluate the success of task execution; (b) in addition to the rigid-body simulation, VRGym supports realistic real-time fluid
and cloth simulations, leveraging state-of-the-art game engines. Reproduced from Ref. [349] with permission of Association for Computing Machinery, c© 2019.
8. Summary and Discussions
Robots are mechanically capable of performing a wide
range of complex activities; however, in practice, they do very
little that is useful for humans. Today’s robots fundamentally
lack physical and social common sense; this limitation inhibits
their capacity to aid in our daily lives. In this article, we have
reviewed five concepts that are the crucial building blocks of
common sense: functionality, physics, intent, causality, and
utility (FPICU). We argued that these cognitive abilities have
shown potential to be, in turn, the building blocks of cognitive
AI, and should therefore be the foundation of future efforts in
constructing this cognitive architecture. The positions taken in
this article are not intended to serve as the solution for the future
of cognitive AI. Rather, by identifying these crucial concepts,
we want to call attention to pathways that have been less well
explored in our rapidly developing AI community. There are
indeed many other topics that we believe are also essential AI
ingredients; for example:
• A physically realistic VR/MR platform: from big data to big
tasks. Since FPICU is “dark”—meaning that it often does
not appear in the form of pixels—it is difficult to evaluate
FPICU in traditional terms. Here, we argue that the ultimate
standard for validating the effectiveness of FPICU in AI is to
examine whether an agent is capable of (i) accomplishing the
very same task using different sets of objects with different
instructions and/ or sequences of actions in different envi-
ronments; and (ii) rapidly adapting such learned knowledge
to entirely new tasks. By leveraging state-of-the-art game
engines and physics-based simulations, we are beginning to
explore this possibility on a large scale; see Section 8.1.
• Social system: the emergence of language, communication,
and morality. While FPICU captures the core components
of a single agent, modeling interaction among and within
agents, either in collaborative or competitive situations [368],
is still a challenging problem. In most cases, algorithms de-
signed for a single agent would be difficult to generalize to
a multiple-agent systems (MAS) setting [369, 370, 371]. We
provide a brief review of three related topics in Section 8.2.
• Measuring the limits of an intelligence system: IQ tests.
Studying FPICU opens a new direction of analogy and re-
lational reasoning [372]. Apart from the four-term analogy
(or proportional analogy), John C. Raven [373] proposed the
raven’s prograssive matrices test (RPM) in the image do-
main. The RAVEN dataset [374] was recently introduced
in the computer vision community, and serves as a system-
atic benchmark for many visual reasoning models. Empiri-
cal studies show that abstract-level reasoning, combined with
effective feature-extraction models, could notably improve
the performance of reasoning, analogy, and generalization.
However, the performance gap between human and compu-
tational models calls for future research in this field; see Sec-
tion 8.3.
8.1. Physically-Realistic VR/MR Platform: From Big-Data to
Big-Tasks
A hallmark of machine intelligence is the capability to
rapidly adapt to new tasks and “achieve goals in a wide range
of environments” [375]. To reach this goal, we have seen the
increasing use of synthetic data and simulation platforms for in-
door scenes in recent years by leveraging state-of-the-art game
engines and free, publicly available 3D content [376, 377, 288,
378], including MINOR [379], HoME [380], Gibson [381],
House3D [382], AI-THOR [383], VirtualHome [384], VR-
Gym [349] (Fig. 36), and VRKitchen [385]. In addition, the
AirSim [386] open-source simulator was developed for outdoor
scenarios. Such synthetic data could be relatively easily scaled
up compared with traditional data collection and labeling pro-
cesses. With increasing realism and faster rendering speeds
built on dedicated hardware, synthetic data from the virtual
world is becoming increasingly similar to data collected from
the physical world. In these realistic virtual environments, it
is possible to evaluate any AI method or system from a much
more holistic perspective. Using a holistic evaluation, whether
a method or a system is intelligent or not is no longer measured
by the successful performance of a single narrow task; rather, it
is measured by the ability to perform well across various tasks:
the perception of environments, planning of actions, predictions
of other agents’ behaviors, and ability to rapidly adapt learned
knowledge to new environments for new tasks.
To build this kind of task-driven evaluation, physics-
based simulations for multi-material, multi-physics phenomena
(Fig. 37) will play a central role. We argue that cognitive AI
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Figure 37: Diverse physical phenomena simulated using the material point method (MPM).
needs to accelerate the pace of its adoption of more advanced
simulation models from computer graphics, in order to bene-
fit from the capability of highly predictive forward simulations,
especially graphics processing unit (GPU) optimizations that
allow real-time performance [387]. Here, we provide a brief
review of the recent physics-based simulation methods, with a
particular focus on the material point method (MPM).
The accuracy of physics-based reasoning greatly relies on
the fidelity of a physics-based simulation. Similarly, the scope
of supported virtual materials and their physical and interac-
tive properties directly determine the complexity of the AI tasks
involving them. Since the pioneering work of Terzopouloset
al. [388, 389] for solids and that of Foster and Metaxas [390]
for fluids, many mathematical and physical models in computer
graphics have been developed and applied to the simulation of
solids and fluids in a 3D virtual environment.
For decades, the computer graphics and computational
physics community sought to increase the robustness, effi-
ciency, stability, and accuracy of simulations for cloth, col-
lisions, deformable, fire, fluids, fractures, hair, rigid bodies,
rods, shells, and many other substances. Computer simulation-
based engineering science plays an important role in solving
many modern problems as an inexpensive, safe, and analyz-
able companion to physical experiments. The most challenging
problems are those involving extreme deformation, topology
change, and interactions among different materials and phases.
Examples of these problems include hypervelocity impact, ex-
plosion, crack evolution, fluid-structure interactions, climate
simulation, and ice-sheet movements. Despite the rapid devel-
opment of computational solid and fluid mechanics, effectively
and efficiently simulating these complex phenomena remains
difficult. Based on how the continuous physical equations are
discretized, the existing methods can be classified into the fol-
lowing categories:
1. Eulerian grid-based approaches, where the computational
grid is fixed in space, and physical properties advect through
the deformation flow. A typical example is the Eulerian
simulation of free surface incompressible flow [391, 392].
Eulerian methods are more error-prone and require delicate
treatment when dealing with deforming material interfaces
and boundary conditions, since no explicit tracking of them
is available.
2. Lagrangian mesh-based methods, represented by FEM [393,
394, 395], where the material is described with and embed-
ded in a deforming mesh. Mass, momentum, and energy
conservation can be solved with less effort. The main prob-
lem of acfem is mesh distortion and lack of contact dur-
ing large deformations [396, 397] or topologically changing
events [398].
3. Lagrangian mesh-free methods, such as smoothed particle
hydrodynamics (SPH) [399] and the reproducing kernel par-
ticle method (RKPM) [400]. These methods allow arbi-
trary deformation but require expensive operations such as
neighborhood searching [401]. Since the interpolation ker-
nel is approximated with neighboring particles, these meth-
ods also tend to suffer from numerical instability issues.
4. Hybrid LagrangianEulerian methods, such as the arbitrary
LagrangianEulerian (ALE) methods [402] and the MPM.
These methods (particularly the MPM) combine the advan-
tages of both Lagrangian methods and Eulerian grid meth-
ods by using a mixed representation.
In particular, as a generalization of the hybrid fluid im-
plicit particle (FLIP) method [403, 404] from computational
fluid dynamics to computational solid mechanics, the MPM
has proven to be a promising discretization choice for sim-
ulating many solid and fluid materials since its introduction
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two decades ago [405, 406]. In the field of visual comput-
ing, existing work includes snow [407, 408], foam [409, 410,
411], sand [412, 413], rigid body [414], fracture [415, 416],
cloth [417], hair [418], water [419], and solid-fluid mix-
tures [420, 421, 422]. In computational engineering science,
this method has also become one of the most recent and ad-
vanced discretization choices for various applications. Due to
its many advantages, it has been successfully applied to tackling
extreme deformation events such as fracture evolution [423],
material failure [424, 425], hyper-velocity impact [426, 427],
explosion [428], fluid-structure interaction [429, 430], biome-
chanics [431], geomechanics [432], and many other examples
that are considerably more difficult when addressed with tra-
ditional, non-hybrid approaches. In addition to experiencing a
tremendously expanding scope of application, the MPM’s dis-
cretization scheme has been extensively improved [433]. To
alleviate numerical inaccuracy and stability issues associated
with the original MPM formulation, researchers have proposed
different variations of the MPM, including the generalized in-
terpolation material point (GIMP) method [434, 435], the con-
vected particle domain interpolation (CPDI) method [436], and
the dual domain material point (DDMP) method [437].
8.2. Social System: Emergence of Language, Communication,
and Morality
Being able to communicate and collaborate with other
agents is a crucial component of AI. In classic AI, a multi-
agent communication strategy is modeled using a predefined
rule-based system (e.g., adaptive learning of communication
strategies in MAS [368]). To scale up from rule-based systems,
decentralized partially observable Markov decision processes
were devised to model multi-agent interaction, with communi-
cation being considered as a special type of action [438, 439].
As with the success of RL in single-agent games [440], gener-
alizing Q-learning [441, 371] and actor-critic [369, 442]-based
methods from single-agent system to MAS have been a boom-
ing topic in recent years.
The emergence of language is also a fruitful topic in multi-
agent decentralized collaborations. By modeling communica-
tion as a particular type of action, recent research [370, 443,
444] has shown that agents can learn how to communicate with
continuous signals that are only decipherable within a group.
The emergence of more realistic communication protocols us-
ing discrete messages has been explored in various types of
communication games [445, 446, 447, 448], in which agents
need to process visual signals and attach discrete tokens to at-
tributes or semantics of images in order to form effective pro-
tocols. By letting groups of agents play communication games
spontaneously, several linguistic phenomena in emergent com-
munication and language have been studied [449, 450, 451].
Morality is an abstract and complex concept composed of
common principles such as fairness, obligation, and permissi-
bility. It is deeply rooted in the tradeoffs people make every
day when these moral principles come into conflict with one
another [452, 453]. Moral judgment is extremely complicated
due to the variability in standards among different individuals,
social groups, cultures, and even forms of violation of ethi-
cal rules. For example, two distinct societies could hold op-
posite views on preferential treatment of kin: one might view
it as corrupt, the other as a moral obligation [367]. Indeed,
the same principle might be viewed differently in two social
groups with distinct cultures [454]. Even within the same so-
cial group, different individuals might have different standards
on the same moral principle or event that triggers moral judg-
ment [455, 456, 457]. Many works have proposed theoreti-
cal accounts for categorizing the different measures of welfare
used in moral calculus, including “base goods” and “primary
goods” [458, 459], “moral foundations” [460], and the feasi-
bility of value judgment from an infant’s point of view [461].
Despite its complexity and diversity, devising a computational
account of morality and moral judgment is an essential step
on the path toward building humanlike machines. One re-
cent approach to moral learning combines utility calculus and
Bayesian inference to distinguish and evaluate different princi-
ples [367, 462, 363].
8.3. Measuring the Limits of Intelligence System: IQ tests
In the literature, we call two cases analogous if they share
a common relationship. Such a relationship does not need to
be among entities or ideas that use the same label across dis-
ciplines, such as computer vision and AI; rather, “analogous”
emphasizes commonality on a more abstract level. For exam-
ple, according to Ref. [463], the earliest major scientific discov-
ery made through analogy can be dated back to imperial Rome,
when investigators analogized waves in water and sound. They
posited that sound waves and water waves share similar behav-
ioral properties; for example, their intensities both diminish as
they propagate across space. To make a successful analogy, the
key is to understand causes and their effects [464].
The history of analogy can be categorized into three streams
of research; see Ref. [372] for a capsule history and review
of the literature. One stream is the psychometric tradition
of four-term or “proportional” analogies, the earliest discus-
sions of which can be traced back to Aristotle [465]. An
example in AI is the word2vec model [466, 467], which is
capable of making a four-term word analogy; for example,
[king:queen::man:woman]. In the image domain, a similar test
was invented by John C. Raven [373]—the raven’s prograssive
matrices test (RPM).
RPM has been widely accepted and is believed to be highly
correlated with real intelligence [468]. Unlike visual question
answering (VQA) [469], which lies at the periphery of the cog-
nitive ability test circle [468], RPM lies directly at the center: it
is diagnostic of abstract and structural reasoning ability [470],
and captures the defining feature of high-level cognition—that
is, fluid intelligence [471]. It has been shown that RPM is more
difficult than existing visual reasoning tests in the following
ways [374]:
• Unlike VQA, where natural language questions usually im-
ply what the agent should pay attention to in an image, RPM
relies merely on visual clues provided in the matrix. The
correspondence problem itself, that is, the ability to find cor-
responding objects across frames to determine their relation-
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Figure 38: The RAVEN creation process proposed in Ref. [374]. A graphical illustration of (a) the grammar production rules used in (b) A-SIG. (c) Note that Layout
and Entity have associated attributes. (d) A sample problem matrix and (e) a sample candidate set. Reproduced from Ref. [374] with permission of the authors,
c© 2019.
ship, is already a major factor distinguishing populations of
different intelligence [468].
• While current visual reasoning tests only require spatial and
semantic understanding, RPM needs joint spatial-temporal
reasoning in the problem matrix and the answer set. The limit
of short-term memory, the ability to understand analogy, and
the grasp of structure must be taken into consideration in or-
der to solve an RPM problem.
• Structures in RPM make the compositions of rules much
more complicated. Problems in RPM usually include more
sophisticated logic with recursions. Combinatorial rules
composed at various levels also make the reasoning process
extremely difficult.
The RAVEN dataset [374] was created to push the limit of
current vision systems’ reasoning and analogy-making ability,
and to promote further research in this area. The dataset is de-
signed to focus on reasoning and analogizing instead of only vi-
sual recognition. It is unique in the sense that it builds a seman-
tic link between the visual reasoning and structural reasoning in
RPM by grounding each problem into a sentence derived from
an attributed stochastic image grammar attributed stochastic
image grammar (A-SIG): each instance is a sentence sampled
from a predefined A-SIG, and a rendering engine transforms the
sentence into its corresponding image. (See Fig. 38 [374] for a
graphical illustration of the generation process.) This semantic
link between vision and structure representation opens new pos-
sibilities by breaking down the problem into image understand-
ing and abstract-level structure reasoning. Zhang et al. [374]
empirically demonstrated that models using a simple structural
reasoning module to incorporate both vision-level understand-
ing and abstract-level reasoning and analogizing notably im-
proved their performance in RPM, whereas a variety of prior
approaches to relational learning performed only slightly better
than a random guess.
Analogy consists of more than mere spatiotemporal parsing
and structural reasoning. For example, the contrast effect [472]
has been proven to be one of the key ingredients in relational
and analogical reasoning for both human and machine learn-
ing [473, 474, 475, 476, 477]. Originating from perceptual
learning [478, 479], it is well established in the field of psy-
chology and education [480, 481, 482, 483, 484] that teaching
new concepts by comparing noisy examples is quite effective.
Smith and Gentner [485] summarized that comparing cases fa-
cilitates transfer learning and problem-solving, as well as the
ability to learn relational categories. In his structure-mapping
theory, Gentner [486] postulated that learners generate a struc-
tural alignment between two representations when they com-
pare two cases. A later article [487] firmly supported this idea
and showed that finding the individual difference is easier for
humans when similar items are compared. A more recent study
from Schwartz et al. [488] also showed that contrasting cases
helps to foster an appreciation of deep understanding. To re-
trieve this missing treatment of contrast in machine learning,
computer vision and, more broadly, in AI, Zhang et al. [489]
proposed methods of learning perceptual inference that explic-
itly introduce the notion of contrast in model training. Specif-
ically, a contrast module and a contrast loss are incorporated
into the algorithm at the model level and at the objective level,
respectively. The permutation-invariant contrast module sum-
marizes the common features from different objects and dis-
tinguishes each candidate by projecting it onto its residual on
the common feature space. The final model, which comprises
ideas from contrast effects and perceptual inference, achieved
state-of-the-art performance on major RPM datasets.
Parallel to work on RPM, work on number sense [490]
bridges the induction of symbolic concepts and the competence
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of problem-solving; in fact, number sense could be regarded
as a mathematical counterpart to the visual reasoning task of
RPM. A recent work approaches the analogy problem from this
perspective of strong mathematical reasoning [491]. Zhang et
al. [491] studied the machine number-sense problem and pro-
posed a dataset of visual arithmetic problems for abstract and
relational reasoning, where the machine is given two figures
of numbers following hidden arithmetic computations and is
tasked to work out a missing entry in the final answer. Solving
machine number-sense problems is non-trivial: the system must
both recognize a number and interpret the number with its con-
texts, shapes, and relationships (e.g., symmetry), together with
its proper operations. Experiments show that the current neural-
network-based models do not acquire mathematical reasoning
abilities after learning, whereas classic search-based algorithms
equipped with an additional perception module achieve a sharp
performance gain with fewer search steps. This work also sheds
some light on how machine reasoning could be improved: the
fusing of classic search-based algorithms with modern neural
networks in order to discover essential number concepts in fu-
ture research would be an encouraging development.
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